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Abstract:	 The	 notion	 that	 legal	 institutions	 matter	 for	 growth	 and	 development	 can	
hardly	be	disputed	in	a	world	of	non-zero	transaction	costs.	This	research	advances	the	
hypothesis	 that	 transaction	 costs	 explain	 large	 and	 wide-standing	 cross-country	
productivity	 differences.	 We	 examine	 the	 contribution	 of	 transaction	 costs	 to	 total	
factor	productivity	for	a	large	panel	of	countries.	We	show	that	transaction	costs	reflect	
the	 policy	 constraints,	 country-specific	 policies,	 distortions	 and	 barriers	 to	 entry	 that	
discourage	 the	 adoption	 of	 the	 efficient	 use	 of	 technology	 by	 protecting	 the	 vested	
interests	 in	 the	 existing	 production	 process.	 Our	 findings	 suggest	 that	 lower	 costs	 of	
contract	 enforcement,	 low-cost	 and	 efficient	 insolvency	 framework	 and	 accessible	
property	 rights	 contribute	 substantially	 to	 TFP	 growth	 over	 time	while	weaker	 effects	
are	 found	 for	 lighter	 business	 registration	 and	 licensing	 requirements.	Our	 results	 are	
stable	 across	 a	 variety	 of	 estimation	 techniques.	 By	 exploiting	 the	 variation	 in	 pre-
industrial	 urbanization	 rate,	 disease	 environment,	 and	 latent	 cultural	 traits,	 we	 show	
that	the	negative	effect	of	rising	transaction	costs	on	TFP	appears	to	be	causal.		
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1 Introduction 
 
The relative differences in total factor productivity (TFP) across 
countries have received widespread scholarly attention (Färe et al. 1994, 
Young 1994, Coe and Helpman 1995, Edwards 1998, Prescott 1998, Temple 
1999, Miller et al. 2000, Baier et al. 2006, Restuccia and Rogerson 2008). It is 
widely acclaimed that the differences in TFP over time account for the 
wide-standing gaps in per capita income levels across countries (Romer 
1987, 1993, Jones 1995, Caselli et al. 1996, Parente and Prescott 2005, 
Córdoba and Ripoll 2008). Countries with lower TFP are condemned to 
substantially slower path of economic growth over time, which largely 
determines the international income per capita gaps. (Prescott and Boyd 
1987, Parente 1994). 
If TFP differences are the ultimate source of per capita income gaps 
across countries, the obvious question to ask is what explain contrasting 
differences in TFP levels across and within countries. Parente and Prescott 
(2000) suggest that TFP differences are primarily the result of 
country-specific policies, distortions, and barriers to entry that establish 
constraints on labor supply, and on the application of better firm-level 
production methods. They argue that many of these barriers protect the 
interests of groups vested in the current production processes, discourage 
technology adoption and lead to slow economic growth over time. 
Although the importance of barriers to the efficient use of technology is 
essential for understanding why Northwestern Europe and United States 
were the first to embark on the path of modern economic growth 
(Rosenberg and Birdzell 1986, Clark 1987, Mokyr 1992, Bairoch 1993, 
Landes 1998, Pomeranz 1998, Maddison 2005, Milanovic 2011, Van 
Zanden et al. 2014, Bolt and van Zanden 2014), it remains less clear which 
particular types of policy constraints and distortions are the most 
important ones in influencing the efficient use of technologies and 
adoption of new ones. 
Since the early days of new institutional economics, we know that 
transaction costs and legal institutions have a significant impact on the 
efficient use of technology, and the wealth of nations (Arruñada and 
Garoupa 2007, La Porta et al. 2008, Cooter and Schäfer 2012). The 
precedence of transaction costs in explaining the efficient use of 
technology has been widely discussed by Coase (1960), Arrow (1969), 
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Cheung (1969), Demsetz (1988), North (1990), Williamson (1996, 2000) and 
Posner (1998, 2010) among many others. However, it remains less clear 
how the legal institutions can be appropriately operationalized to explain 
large gaps in the adoption of efficient technology across countries. It 
remains somewhat of a mystery which particular types of transaction costs 
influence the (in)ability of countries to adopt the efficient use of 
technology. Such an inquiry may nevertheless unravel the critical 
country-specific policies, distortions and barriers to entry that serve the 
vested interests, impede the efficient use of technology and, hence, 
condemn societies to slow growth and persistent income and technology 
gap behind the frontier countries such as United States and Switzerland. 
Conventional economic wisdom holds that growth is always 
efficient. In the world with non-zero transaction costs, growth may occur 
even in the presence of resource misallocation. Modern growth theory 
suggests that growth based on factor accumulation alone without the 
adoption and use of efficient technologies is bound by the diminishing 
returns to scale (Easterly et al. 1993, Aghion et al. 1998, Howitt and 
Aghion 1998, Jones 1999, Segerstrom 2000, Aghion and Howitt 2005). 
Hence, factor accumulation without efficiency gains may never allow 
catching-up countries to close the income gap behind the frontier (Durlauf 
and Quah. 1999, Salinas Jiménez et al. 2006, Jerzmanowski 2007, Erosa and 
Cabrillana 2008), and condemn them to inefficient growth (Acemoglu and 
Zilibotti 2001). The notion that institutional environment is the ultimate 
force behind long-run growth differences has become widely 
acknowledged (Scully 1988, Knack and Keefer 1995, Gould and Gruben 
1996, Hall and Jones 1999, Rodrik et al. 2004, Acemoglu et al. 2005, 
Trebilcock and Leng 2006, Auer 2013). Countries with institutional 
framework that strengthens property rights and minimizes contract 
enforcement costs between citizens tend to be substantially richer than 
countries with weaker property rights and costly contracting institutions 
(Torstensson 1994, Barro 1996, Brunetti et al 1998, Levine 1998, Acemoglu 
et al. 2001, Mahoney 2001, Falvey et al. 2006, Djankov et al. 2006, Amaral 
and Quintin 2010, Acemoglu and Robinson 2010), and enjoy greater levels 
of financial development (Clague et al. 1996, 1999, Beck et al. 2003, 
Claessens et al. 2003, Beck and Levine 2008, Helpman 2009). Although the 
relationship between various types of property rights- and contracting 
institutions and long-run economic growth is well-documented, the link 
between transaction costs and TFP is less clear. 
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In this paper, we set to examine the contribution of transaction costs 
to TFP across and within countries to unveil the barriers, constraints, 
policies and distortions that prevent the adoption of new technologies or a 
more efficient use of existing ones. The cornerstone of our argument is that 
high transaction costs discourage the adoption of new technologies or 
more efficient use of existing one, and favor factor accumulation as the 
underlying engine of growth. Because of the differences in initial 
conditions, high transaction costs dampen the efficiency gains and lead to 
the inefficient growth trap, i.e. subsequent low TFP growth in less 
developed countries and TFP slowdown in advanced economies. We 
further unravel the heterogeneity and non-linearity of transaction costs in 
influencing growth and show that cost-induced policy distortions strongly 
discourage TFP, particularly in high-income countries. This suggests that 
transaction costs in frontier economies might be crucial in explaining TFP 
growth over time. 
Several papers are related to our one. Acemoglu et al. (2006) build a 
formal model of the economy where firms undertake innovation and the 
adoption of frontier technologies. They show that as the economy 
approaches the frontier, selection of high-skill managers becomes more 
important while countries at lower stages of development tend to pursue 
accumulation-based strategy and rely on factor accumulation sacrificing 
selection. Closer to the technology frontier, economies switch to 
innovation-based strategy with younger firms, more efficient use of 
technology and the adoption of new technologies, and with better 
selection of firms and managers. Distortionary policies and sources of 
transaction costs such as limits on product market competition and 
investment subsidies may be beneficial in the short run but have 
significant long-run costs as they are likely to prevent the economies from 
exiting the investment-based strategy, failing to converge with the world 
frontier. Prescott (1998) shows that differences in factor accumulation and 
the stock of available knowledge are of minor importance in explaining 
large international income differences, and suggests that TFP differences 
account for the bulk of variation in income levels across countries. If the 
institutional environment is the fundamental force behind long-run 
growth differences, the differences in transaction costs as the key layer of 
contracting institutions should have a non-negligible role in the origins 
and mechanisms behind the TFP differences across and within countries. 
Concurrently, Rodrik (2008) suggests that any normative implication on 
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how to improve the institutional environment to foster economic growth 
is contingent on identifying the binding constraint on economic growth, 
which starkly differs across countries, and is far from a universal 
“one-size-fits-all” variety of institutional reform set. And lastly, Posner 
(1998) and Beck (2010) suggest that although coercion-constraining 
institutions that guarantee private property rights and effective, 
predictable, and fair low-cost enforcement of contracts foster 
entrepreneurship, trade and market exchange, and help economies grow 
faster, much less is known about which layers of institutions matter most 
(Acemoglu and Johnson 2005). 
We test the transaction costs-TFP hypothesis in a sample of 143 
countries in the period 2003-2014 using 24 different comparable 
country-level indicators. To this end, we reconstruct the TFP levels both 
across and within countries from the augmented Solow growth model 
using the data from Penn World Tables (Feenstra et al. 2016). We show 
that conventional measures of TFP may be subject to temporal and spatial 
bias resulting from the hidden effect of common technology shocks and 
country-specific heterogeneity (Serot 1993, Mairesse and Mohnen 2002, 
Mahadevan 2003, Di Liberto et al. 2008, Del Gatto et al. 2010). We exploit 
the variation in historical urbanization rate, the prevalence of toxoplasma 
gondii parasite (Maseland 2013), and cultural traits as possibly exogenous 
sources of variation in transaction costs, and show that the negative effect 
of rising transaction costs on TFP appears to be causal. 
Our results show that transaction costs might be one of the missing 
puzzles explaining TFP differences across and within countries. Higher 
transaction costs are associated with marked decline in TFP levels across 
and within countries. However, not all transaction costs are created equal. 
Higher administrative transaction costs, such as stricter licencing 
requirements, are associated with marked TFP gains over time. On the 
other hand, higher procedural transaction costs and the administrative 
costs related to the duration of procedure tend to produce either 
stationary TFP growth, sustained TFP decline or short-lived, 
mean-reverting TFP increases. The effect of procedural transaction costs 
on TFP is both quantitatively large and statistically significant at 
conventional acceptance rates. 
Several caveats should be stated. First, the data availability does not 
allow us to explore the entire realm of transaction costs and their 
underlying effect on TFP more fully. The established effects correspond to 
a fraction of observable transaction costs rather than to the whole 
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spectrum of costs. Second, the time period of our investigation comprises 
12 years. We are fully aware that a more nuanced analysis of the 
relationship between transaction costs and TFP would require the data 
spanning across several decades before the effects are fully materialized. 
Thus, the evidence presented in this paper offers a first look at the results 
of transaction costs on TFP over a relatively short period of time. 
Nonetheless, despite the temporal limitation, the evidence still confirms 
the fundamental importance of transaction costs for TFP development 
over time even under a relatively short time span which arguably suggests 
that transaction costs are simply all too important for TFP to be left to 
scholarly neglect. 
Our paper offers several normative suggestions to the policymakers 
on how to address the barriers, policy constraints and distortions that 
systematically hamper TFP growth. First, different types of transaction 
costs tend to influence TFP differently. The magnitude of the estimated 
effects is far from uniform. Our evidence suggests that rising procedural 
transaction costs tend to yield a quantitatively much larger effect on TFP 
than a corresponding change in administrative transaction costs. A 
well-intentioned policymaker aiming for removing the barriers to TFP 
should focus on establishing low-cost enforcement of contracts, 
strengthening property rights and creditor protection (Treblicock and 
Daniels 2009). Our model estimates suggest that TFP should rise 
substantially in response to shorter duration of procedures and lower 
monetary costs of contract enforcement and property rights. The role of 
administrative transaction costs in TFP growth is less certain. Contrary to 
popular policy notions, our evidence does not advocate TFP gains in 
response to markedly lower administrative transaction costs across the 
board. At best, our results suggest that shorter duration of administrative 
procedures may boost TFP levels whereas the effects appear to be 
hump-shaped with TFP-maximizing levels. Second, the evidence 
subscribes to Rodrik (2008) second-best view of institutional change with 
emphasis on transaction costs. According to this view, policymakers in 
developing countries should focus on establishing second-best 
institutional environment that takes into account context-specific market 
and government failures. Levels of transaction costs vary widely across 
countries. While some countries are constrained by the weakness of 
contract enforcement, others’ primary concern is costly and 
creditor-biased insolvency framework. Hence, policymakers should focus 
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on targeting the set of transaction costs, which comprise the binding 
constraints on TFP growth. Once the binding constraint is identified, the 
policymakers should focus on designing the appropriate policy measures 
to remove the constraint rather than pursing a “one-size-fits-all” policy 
package (Rodrik 2006). Third, the evidence offers ample support to the 
notion that getting administrative transaction costs to zero is questionable 
(Arruñada 2007). If anything, removing the administrative barriers to 
business registration and licensing requirements altogether appears to 
yield no discernable increase in TFP while keeping such barriers as a 
screening device on incumbent firms tends to boost TFP consistently and 
may be viewed as a form of productive formalism (Epstein 1984). 
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we present and 
discuss the identification strategy. Section 3 presents the data. Section 4 
discusses the results and a variety of robustness checks. Section 5 
concludes. 
 
2 Identification Strategy 
 
Our goal is to estimate the contribution of transaction costs to total 
factor productivity (TFP) consistently. The basic cross-country TFP level 
relationship with the unobserved effects and common technology shocks 
that takes place is: 
 
{ } { }
, 0 1 , 1 , 2 ,
,
1 1
ˆ ˆ ˆ
ˆ ˆ1 0,1 1 0,1
j t j t j t j t
J T
j t j t
j t
TFP C k h
i t u
γ λ µ µ β
π
= =
= + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ +
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤+ Φ ⋅ ∈ + ⋅ ∈ +⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦∑ ∑
X'
       (1) 
 
where TFP is the level of total factor productivity in j-th country where 
1,2,...j J= , 0γ   is the common TFP level accessible to all countries, C  
denotes transaction cost variable, k denotes physical capital investment, h 
denotes human capital investment, the set of Φˆ j  response coefficient 
comprises the full set of country-fixed effects, πˆ t  is the full set of 
time-fixed effects capturing the influence of technology shocks common to 
all countries, X denotes the vector of control variables such as the size of 
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the manufacturing sector, share of R&D expenditure, various measures of 
financial development, trade openness and macroeconomic stability 
covariates, and u is the random error term capturing transitory stochastic 
disturbances. The key coefficient of interest is 1ˆλ  which denotes the 
contribution of transaction costs to TFP level. 
To allow for arbitrary serially correlated stochastic disturbances 
and heteroscedasticity distribution of residual variance across and within 
countries, the standard errors are clustered on country-level and 
time-level using the non-nested multiway clustering estimator for the 
empirical distribution function (Cameron, Gelbach and Miller 2011). 
Allowing for the non-linearities in the effect of transaction costs on TFP, 
the basic empirical model setup is: 
 
( )
{ } { }
, 0 1 , 1 , 2 ,
1
,
1 1
ˆ ˆ
ˆ ˆ1 0,1 1 0,1
P
j t j t j t j t
p
J T
j t j t
j t
TFP C p k h
i t u
γ λ µ µ β
π
=
= =
= + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ +
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤+ Φ ⋅ ∈ + ⋅ ∈ +⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
∑
∑ ∑
X'
       (2) 
 
where p denotes the p-th order polynomial term in the underlying 
transaction cost C variable of interest. The chief threat to the validity of 
fixed-effects TFP specification is posited by the violation of strict 
exogeneity assumption since the lagged levels of TFP are by default 
correlated with the error term. When the strict exogeneity assumption is 
violated, the fixed-effect estimate of λˆ  in Eq. (2) is inconsistent. We 
mitigate the possible violation of strict exogeneity assumption by 
deploying Arellano and Bond (1991) dynamic panel data estimator, and 
eliminate the fixed-effects using first-differences in Eq. (2) to achieve 
parameter consistency and asymptotic efficiency in the presence of 
heteroskedastic residual distribution. In particular, we re-evaluate the 
effects of transaction costs on TFP by estimating the following dynamic 
panel data TFP specification: 
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{ } { }
, 0 , 1 , 2 ,
1
,
1 1
ˆ ˆ
ˆ ˆ1 0,1 1 0,1
K
j t k j t k j t j t
k
J T
j t j t
j t
TFP TFP k h
i t
γ α λ µ µ β
π ξ
−
=
= =
= + × + + ⋅ + ⋅ +
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤+ Φ ⋅ ∈ + ⋅ ∈ +⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
∑
∑ ∑
' '
j,t i,tc x
     (3) 
 
for each =1,2,...j J , and 1,2,..., it T=  where α  denotes k-th lag of the 
TFP with 1k = , i,tx  is an 11 m×  vector of strictly exogenous covariates 
from Eq. (2), i,tc  is the pre-determined and endogenous transaction costs 
to be estimated, λ  is the set of transaction costs parameters, jD  and 
tD is the set of panel-level country-fixed effects and time-fixed effects 
correlated with the covariances, and ,j tξ  is the set of stochastic 
disturbances. Dynamic panel specification for TFP also allows us to 
determine which transaction costs matter for TFP after controlling for the 
TFP state dependence, and the set of technology shocks common to all 
countries. 
Another key threat to the validity of our empirical strategy 
concerns the endogeneity of transaction costs. Since high-TFP countries 
are more likely to afford low transaction costs, the estimated coefficients, 
the estimated transaction cost parameters might be plagued by the reverse 
causation. In the absence of plausibly exogenous sources of variation, the 
estimated parameters do not unveil whether changes in TFP shape 
transaction costs or vice versa. Econometrically, the presence of omitted 
variable bias inherent in Eq. (2) implies that ( )cov , 0C u ≠  which renders 
the estimated transaction cost parameter implausible by violating the 
exogeneity assumption. 
Our approach to tackle the reverse causation in the relationship 
between transaction costs TFP is to exploit time-invariant historical 
shocks, disease environment, and cultural traits as plausibly exogenous 
sources of variation to consistently estimate the contribution of transaction 
costs to TFP. Specifically, we isolate the effects of transaction costs on TFP 
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from other observables and unobservable channels by exploiting the 
cross-country variation in time-invariant shocks, disease environment and 
cultural traits by deploying four instrumental variables. First, following 
Acemoglu et al. (2002), we compute the country-level urbanization rate in 
1500 as a relevant source of variation in long-run transaction costs. 
Second, similar to Maseland (2013), we use the prevalence of toxoplasma 
gondii parasite as a proxy for the disease environment to address the 
endogeneity of transaction costs as an institutional variable, and prevent 
the omitted variable bias from contaminating the model setup. And third, 
we exploit the variation in cultural traits as a relevant source of variation 
in transaction costs (Klasing 2013) to partially mitigate the reverse 
causation inherent in the nexus between transaction costs as an 
institutional variable and growth. Our key identifying assumption is that 
the historical shocks, disease environment, and cultural traits do not 
influence TFP beyond their effect on transaction costs, which we subject to 
rigorous tests. Econometrically, our covariance restrictions to maintain the 
exogeneity assumption, are ( ) =1500, ,cov , 0j t j tU u , ( )Δ =, ,cov , 0j t j tu  and 
( )Κ =, ,cov , 0j t j tu , where 1500,j tU  is the country-level urbanization rate in 
the year 1500, Δ  is the measure of disease environment proxied by the 
prevalence of toxoplasma gondii, and K is the variable capturing latent 
cultural traits. 
To address the reverse causation between transaction costs and 
TFP, we estimate the following first-stage specification for transaction 
costs  
 
{ } { }
γ γ γ γ µ µ
β π
= =
= + ⋅ + ⋅Δ + ⋅Κ + ⋅ + ⋅
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤+ + Φ ⋅ ∈ + ⋅ ∈ +⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦∑ ∑
1500
, 0 1 , 2 , 3 , 1 , 2 ,
,
1 1
ˆ ˆ
ˆ ˆ1 0,1 1 0,1
j t j t j t j t j t j t
J T
j t i t
j t
C U k h
i t wX'
      (4) 
 
where C  denotes transaction costs in country j at time t, 1500U  is the 
country-level urbanization rate in the year 1500, Δ  denotes the disease 
environment proxied by the prevalence of toxoplasma gondii bacteria, and 
Κ  denotes latent cultural traits while w  denotes the first-stage random 
error term. 
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2.1 Threats to Identification 
The key identifying assumption from our covariance restrictions is 
that the urbanization rate in 1500, the prevalence of toxoplasma gondii 
and latent cultural traits do not influence TFP through channels other than 
transaction costs. Although we subject the identifying assumption to 
rigorous testing, several theoretical caveats about its justification should 
be stated. While it might be superflous to use contemporary urbanization 
rate as an IV for transaction costs given the simultaneity bias, historical 
urbanization rate in 1500 is sufficiently exogenous to isolate the effect of 
costs on TFP as it mimics the historical shock at the juncture point. Second, 
a large strand of literature invokes geographical and climatic factors as an 
explanation for the quality of present-day institutions (Beck et al. 2003, 
Hall and Jones 1999, Acemoglu et al. 2001, Sachs and Malaney 2002). The 
disease environment contributed to the differences in institutional quality 
across country by lowering the costs of establishing extractive institutions, 
which promoted the exploitation of land by the political and economic 
elites. A similar argument is advocated by Sokoloff and Engerman (1997) 
who maintain that natural resource endowments in tropical countries 
evolved into an extreme inequality of land ownership by fostering the 
development of endowment-based economic activities (Bruhn and Gallego 
2012) and institutional framework biased against non-elites (Acemoglu et 
al. 2014), which persist down to the present day. Combined with the 
disease environment, path dependence invokes the relevance of initial 
conditions to shape contemporary institutions (Auer 2013). Hence, the 
disease environment should matter only for the level of transaction costs 
without an independent and discernable effect on TFP. And third, cultural 
traits either enhance or restrain the cooperation among individuals. 
Cultural environment conducive to cooperation, individualism and trust 
tends to foster the efficient provision of public goods, improved state 
capacity and, thus shapes the level of transaction costs. On the other hand, 
the cultural environment characterized by high level of uncertainty 
avoidance, collectivist traits, and greater distrust have been shown to 
increase the demand for redistribution (Alesina and Giuliano 2011), and 
regulation (Aghion et al. 2010). Such cultural traits lower the cost of 
opportunistic behavior, maintain the disrespect for law and order as a 
cultural norm, which condemns institutional development through the 
persistence of high transaction costs. 
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3 Data 
3.1 Total Factor Productivity 
Our total factor productivity series encompasses 143 countries 
spanning across 2003-2014 period based on the underlying augmented 
Solow growth model with physical capital and human capital. Since the 
total factor productivity is measured as a residual from the cross-country 
growth regression, our approach is similar to Feenstra et al. (2015) where 
our data on real GDP per capita (Geary-Khamis 2005 constant prices) are 
from. Our measure of human capital is based on the average years of 
education (Van Leeuwen et al. 2011, Barro and Lee 2012) rather than a 
combined index of human capital return and years of schooling 
(Psacharopoulos 1994). The data on the stock of physical capital is from 
Feenstra et al. (2015) using the investment-to-GDP ratio as a proxy for the 
capital stock following Mankiw et al. (1992) and Acemoglu (2009) whereas 
the data on population growth is from United Nations Demographic 
Yearbook series. Since the level of TFP might exhibit a persistent serial 
correlation over time, the failure to correct the underlying for 
heteroscedasticity might mask the true path of TFP over time. 
Our measure of total factor productivity (TFP) is based on 
computing the Solow residual to obtain the contribution of unobserved 
technology to productivity differences across and within countries. To this 
end, we use Penn World Tables 8 (Feenstra et al. 2015) to derive 
comparable TFP series both with between-country and within-country 
variation in two steps. In the first step, we use the output-based real GDP 
in current-year prices and deflate it with 2005 constant prices to obtain 
country-level real GDP differences over time. The constant prices 
output-based GDP series is derived from the national accounts to yield a 
representative set of growth rates without the PPP adjustment, which 
would change growth rates substantially. In the second step, we use the 
PPP conversion for 2005 benchmark year and apply the growth rates 
backward and forward to construct the TFP level for the full set of 
countries and years. Specifically, we deflate the observed differences in 
output-based GDP by the Törnqvist quantity index of factor endowments 
such as labor and human capital to obtain a meaningful and reasonably 
unbiased measure of PPP-adjusted productivity differences between 
countries. The Törnqvist quantity index of factor endowments is 
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constructed using the observed factor prices and shares. More specifically, 
the aggregate productivity of j-th country relative to the k-th country (i.e 
United States) is written as follows: 
 
( )
* *
* *
* *
1
1ln , , , ln
2
L
lj lj ljlk lk
j k j kTörnqvist
l lkmj mjm mk mkm
w v vw v
Q
vw v w v=
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞
⎜ ⎟= + ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
∑ ∑ ∑
v v w wr      (5) 
 
where ( )* *, , ,j k j kv v w w  is the set of factor endowments, and where *ljw  
and *lkw  denote the factor prices from the reference price and share series. 
The corresponding TFP measure is computed using the growth rate of real 
output-side GDP from the national accounts data: 
 
( )
,
,
, , 1 , , 1, , ,
NA
j t
j t
j t j t j t j tTörnqvist
ry
TFP
Q − −
=
v v w wr         (6) 
 
where TFP denotes the PPP-adjusted total factor productivity in country j 
at time t, NAry  is the 2005 constant-price output-based real GDP † , 
( )TörnqvistQ ⋅r  is the relevant Törnqvist quantity-related index. The advantage 
of the constant-price TFP measure is that it captures structural 
productivity shifts implied from the output-based real GDP level as a 
first-order approximation of TFP differences both across and within 
countries. By default, dividing the observed differences in real GDP by the 
Törnqvist quantity-related index of factor endowments relies on the strict 
neoclassical assumptions such as perfect competition in product and factor 
assumptions. Since TFP level is estimated from translog production 
function, the TFP measure in Eq. (6) reflects cross-country differences in 
aggregate technology as a rough but plausible proxy for TFP level. 
One potential disadvantage of the derived TFP measure is the 
absence of the capital decomposition by asset, which implies that a portion 
                                                
† Since we use national accounts data, the real GDP is measured in country-specific 
national currency unit. 
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of the TFP measure is measured with error. This presents a limitation per 
se to capture the full extent of TFP differences across and within countries 
in our approach. Given a large number of countries for which we observe 
TFP levels and differences, a complete decomposition of capital stock by 
type of asset is too difficult to warrant a conclusive quantification. Since 
the asset-based capital stock decomposition would change the underlying 
weight of the capital stock in approximating the TFP level, the 
contribution of human capital and other factor endowments remains 
generally intact and allows us to use the derived TFP measure to proxy 
TFP differences across countries and over time.  
 
3.2 Transaction Costs 
The data on the size and distribution of transaction costs is based on 
the series of Doing Business reports from the World Bank for the period 
2003-2014. Our focus does not encompass the entire range of transaction 
costs but the subset of costs which can be observed consistently over the 
12-year period across a large number of countries, and are in the realm of 
the firm's life cycle. Even though our approach does not address the entire 
realm of transaction costs, emphasizing several distinctive institutional 
categories of costs permits a first-order approximation of the size of 
transaction costs and its importance in influencing the paths of economic 
growth and total factor productivity. Six institutional categories and 
domains are considered in building the indices of transaction costs. 
First, the costs of starting business records all procedures officially 
required and commonly held in practice to start and formally operate an 
industrial or commercial business (Djankov et al. 2002). The set of 
procedures includes obtaining all necessary licenses and permits, and 
completing any required notifications, verifications, and inscriptions for 
the firm and employees with the relevant authorities. The cost of starting 
business is decomposed into four sub-categories: (i) number of 
procedures, (ii) duration, (iii) monetary cost, and (iv) paid-in minimum 
capital requirements. 
Second, the costs of dealing with construction permits records all 
necessary procedures for a firm in the construction industry to build a 
warehouse. The transaction costs of dealing with permits are decomposed 
into (i) number of procedures, (ii) duration, and (iii) cost of obtaining 
permits to comply with formalities to build a warehouse. 
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Third, the cost of property registration measures the full sequence 
for a firm to purchase a property from another firm, and to transfer the 
property title to the buyer’s name to be used for expanding its business, as 
a collateral in taking new loans, or to sell the property to another firm. The 
total cost of property registration is broken down into three specific 
sub-categories: (i) the number of procedures to legally transfer title on 
immovable property, (ii) time required to complete each procedure, and 
(iii) cost required to complete each procedure. A procedure is defined as 
any interaction of the buyer or the seller, and their legally required agents 
with external agents (government agencies, inspectors, notaries, and 
lawyers). 
Fourth, the cost of paying taxes measures the mandatory 
contributions that a medium-sized firm must pay in a given fiscal year, 
and the administrative burden of paying taxes and contributions (Djankov 
et al. 2010). Measured taxes and contributions include corporate income 
tax, social contributions, labor tax paid by the employer, property taxes, 
property transfer taxes, dividend tax, capital gains tax, financial 
transactions tax, waste collection tax, vehicle and road taxes, and other 
small taxes and fees. The difficulty of paying taxes is decomposed into two 
specific sub-categories: (i) time to pay taxes, and (ii) total tax rate. 
Fifth, the cost of international trade measures the time and cost 
associated with the logistical and administrative process of exporting and 
importing goods (Djankov et al. 2008), and provides a comprehensive 
measure of long-distance trade costs. The cost of international trade is 
broken down into three sub-categories: (i) time to export and import, (ii) 
number of documents necessary to export and import, and (iii) monetary 
cost of export and import (in USD per container). 
Sixth, the cost of contract enforcement measures the time and cost 
for resolving a commercial dispute through a local first-instance court. It 
provides a comprehensive measure of the efficiency of judicial system in 
resolving a commercial dispute (Djankov et al. 2003). Three distinctive 
sub-categories of contract enforcement cost are considered: (i) number of 
procedures to enforce a contract, (ii) duration of enforcing a contract, and 
(iii) cost of enforcing contracts. 
And seventh, the cost of resolving an insolvent firm captures the 
time, cost and outcome of insolvency proceedings, and is derived from 
questionnaire-based responses by local practitioners on insolvency 
proceedings and bankruptcy systems (Djankov et al. 2008a) Three 
sub-categories are considered: (i) time to resolve an insolvent firm, (ii) cost 
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of resolving an insolvent firm, and (iii) creditor recovery rate (in cents per 
USD of creditor claim). 
 
Table	1.	Descriptive	Statistics	
	 	 StD	 	 	 	 	 	
	 Mean	 Within	 Between	 Overall	 Min	 Max	 P25	 P75	 P90	
Panel	A:	Outcomes	
Real	GDP	Per	
Capita	
12256	 1375.92	 13716	 13741	 204.01	 70385	 2233	 17853	 33405	
Total	Factor	
Productivity	
0.000	 0.219	 0.758	 0.787	 -1.863	 7.631	 -0.516	 0.572	 0.927	
Panel	B:	Transaction	Costs	
Costs	of	Starting	Business	
#	Procedures	 0.367	 0.093	 0.178	 0.201	 0	 1	 0.167	 0.500	 0.722	
Duration	(#days)	 0.162	 0.090	 0.135	 0.162	 0	 1	 0.055	 0.204	 0.353	
Cost	 (%	 per	 capita	
income)	
0.024	 0.061	 0.037	 0.071	 0	 1	 0.001	 0.004	 0.049	
Paid-in	 minimum	
capital	 (%	 per	
capita	income)	
0.004	 0.024	 0.011	 0.026	 0	 1	 0.000	 0.001	 0.009	
Cost	of	Dealing	with	Construction	Permits	
#	Procedures	 0.222	 0.086	 0.135	 0.160	 0	 1	 0.109	 0.182	 0.418	
Duration	(#	days)	 0.163	 0.051	 0.110	 0.122	 0	 1	 0.089	 0.198	 0.295	
Cost	 (%	warehouse	
value)	
0.052	 0.056	 0.097	 0.112	 0	 1	 0.005	 0.047	 0.124	
Cost	of	Property	Registration	
#	Procedures	 0.359	 0.049	 0.170	 0.176	 0	 1	 0.231	 0.429	 0.571	
Duration	(#	days)	 0.074	 0.052	 0.079	 0.095	 0	 1	 0.021	 0.085	 0.167	
Cost	 (%	 property	
value)	
	
0.204	 0.055	 0.169	 0.177	 0	 1	 0.079	 0.266	 0.442	
Costs	of	Paying	Taxes	
Duration	(#	hours)	 0.121	 0.036	 0.107	 0.113	 0	 1	 0.062	 0.139	 0.230	
Total	tax	rate	
(%	commercial	
profit)	
0.128	 0.056	 0.097	 0.112	 0	 1	 0.079	 0.143	 0.199	
Cost	of	International	Trade	
#	Documents	to	
export	
0.345	 0.094	 0.148	 0.175	 0	 1	 0.222	 0.444	 0.556	
Time	to	export	(#	
days)	
0.221	 0.055	 0.178	 0.186	 0	 1	 0.095	 0.288	 0.476	
Cost	to	export	
(USD	per	
standardized	cargo	
container)	
0.160	 0.043	 0.143	 0.149	 0	 1	 0.064	 0.198	 0.333	
#Documents	to	
import	
0.329	 0.070	 0.141	 0.157	 0	 1	 0.222	 0.444	 0.500	
Time	to	import	(#	
days)	
0.225	 0.069	 0.174	 0.187	 0	 1	 0.090	 0.310	 0.500	
Cost	to	import	
(USD	per	
standardized	cargo	
container)	
0.147	 0.043	 0.126	 0.133	 0	 1	 0.067	 0.176	 0.311	
Cost	of	Contract	Enforcement	
#	Procedures	 0.468	 0.023	 0.178	 0.179	 0	 1	 0.353	 0.588	 0.676	
Duration	(#	days)	 0.325	 0.045	 0.189	 0.194	 0	 1	 0.198	 0.396	 0.561	
Cost	of	
enforcement	 	
(%	claim)	
0.190	 0.040	 0.176	 0.181	 0	 1	 0.091	 0.221	 0.360	
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(cont'd	Table1)	Cost	of	Resolving	Insolvency	
Duration	(#	years	
to	resolve	an	
insolvent	firm)	
0.284	 0.081	 0.149	 0.169	 0	 1	 0.160	 0.360	 0.510	
Cost	(%	estate)	 0.202	 0.023	 0.153	 0.155	 0	 1	 0.107	 0.280	 0.387	
Recovery	rate	
(cents	per	USD)	
0.613	 0.056	 0.255	 0.261	 0	 1	 0.522	 0.801	 0.912	
 
We construct the level of transaction costs for a total of 24 different 
indicators using the linear scaling transformation (Kovac and Spruk 2015) 
to normalize the differences in transaction costs are countries in the range 
without excessive sampling variation on the scale between 0 and 1 where 
higher values indicate greater transaction costs. Specifically, the linear 
scaling transformation for i-th indicator of transaction that takes place is: 
 
{ }
{ } { }
1 ,2 ,....
1 ,2 ,....1 ,2 ,....
, ,
, ,
min
max min
t t Jt
t t Jtt t Jt
i j t T
i j t
TT
τ
Τ −
=
−
Τ
Τ Τ
 
         (7) 
 
where τ  is the normalized index of i-th transaction cost across 
1,2,...j J=  countries and 1,2,...t T=  years, Τ  is the original 
untransformed transaction cost indicator, and Τ  is the vector of 
transaction cost values per indicator for each year. The key advantage of 
linear scaling transformation is that it allows us to observe a direct 
response of total factor productivity and growth paths to the change in 
transaction costs. Secondly, linear scaling transformation does not suffer 
from excessive sampling variation in the underlying indicators since the 
extent of transaction costs is normalized in a definite range between 0 and 
1. And thirdly, normalizing cross-country differences in transaction costs 
partially alleviates the presence of outliers resulting from either 
excessively high or low observed transaction costs and does not render the 
identification strategy inconsistent or vaguely defined. In Table 1, some 
descriptive statistics for the key outcomes of interest and for the 
transaction costs is presented. Figure 1 plots the first principal component 
of the full set of transaction cost indicators against the TFP series in 2014 
as a reference year, and shows a strong aggregate correlation between 
costs and TFP. 
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Figure	1.	Transaction	Costs	and	Total	Factor	Productivity	Across	143	Countries	
 
 
 
3.3 Covariates and Transmission Mechanism Variables 
Our covariates and potential transmission mechanism variables 
proxy the mechanisms through which transaction costs exhibit the 
influence on TFP. This allows us to distinguish between the set of direct 
and indirect effects of costs on TFP. The set of covariates and transmission 
mechanism variables specifically consists of the share of R&D expenditure 
in percentage of GDP, credit-to-GDP ratio, share of trade in GDP, share of 
manufacturing in GDP, and inflation rate. These variables allow us to 
capture the channels such as financial development, innovation, trade 
openness, manufacturing and macroeconomic stability where the indirect 
effect of transaction costs on TFP may be perceptible. The data on the 
whole set of covariates and transmission mechanism variables is from 
World Development Indicators (World Bank 2015). 
 
 
ALBDZA
AGO
ARG
ARM
AUSAUT
AZEBGD
BLR
BEL
BEN
BOL
BIHBWA
BRA
BGR
BFA
BDI
KHMCMR
CAN
CAF
TCD
CHL
CHN
COL
ZAR
COG
CRI
CIV
HRVCZE
DNK
ECU
EGYSLV
EST
ETH
FJI
FIN
FRA
GEO
DEU
GHA
GRC
GTM
GIN
GUY
HTI
HND
HKG
HUN
ISL
IND
IDN
IRN
IRE
ISR
ITA
JAM
JPN
JOR
KAZ
KEN
KOR
KWT
KGZ
LAOLVA
LBN
LSO
LBR
LTU MKD
MDG
MWI
MYS
MLI
MRT
MUS MEX
MDA
MNG
FEB
MOZ
NAM
NPL
LD
NZL
NIC
NER
NGA
NOR
OMN
PAK
PAN PNG
PRYPER
PHL
POL
PRT
PRI
ROM
RUS RWA
STP
SAU
SEN
SRB
SLE
SGP
SVK
VN
SLB
ZAF
ESP
LKA
SWE
CH
SYR
WN
TZA
THA
TGOTON
TUN
TUR
UGA
UKR
UAE
GBR
USA
URY
UZB
VUT
VEN
VNM
YEM
ZMB
ZWE
-2
-1
0
1
2
TF
P
 (S
ol
ow
 re
si
du
al
 fr
om
 C
ob
b-
D
ou
gl
as
 p
ro
du
ct
io
n 
fu
nc
tio
n)
-5 0 5 10
Transaction Costs (First Principal Component)
Spruk	and	Kovac:	Inefficient	Growth?	
http://www.rei.unipg.it/rei/article/view/268	
 
 
 
19	
3.4 Instrumental Variables 
 
3.4.1 Urbanization Rate in 1500 
A large strand of scholarly literature suggests the pivotal 
importance of the initial conditions for long-term economic outcomes 
(Acemoglu et al. 2002). In a similar vein, we use to urbanization rate in 
1500 to isolate the effects of transaction costs as an institutional variables 
on TFP. The data on urban population is from Fink-Jensen (2015). We 
compute the urbanization ratio by dividing the urban population with the 
country-level total population adjusted for administrative territorial 
boundary changes over time. A brief descriptive evidence suggests an 
arguable importance of urbanization rate in 1500 for present-day 
transaction costs, which is consistent with Acemoglu et al. (2005) who 
argue that the growth of Atlantic trade strengthen merchant groups by 
constraining the political power of monarchs, leading to changes in 
property rights institutions which laid the seeds of subsequent post-1500 
growth. Therefore, urbanization rate in 1500 can be viewed as a rough 
proxy for pre-industrial development (Bairoch 1983, De Vries 1984, De 
Long and Shleifer 1993). Figure 2 plots the urbanization rate in 1500 
against the first principal component of transaction costs described in 
Table 1. 	
Figure	2.	Urbanization	Rate	in	1500	and	Present-Day	Transaction	Costs	
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The aggregate evidence suggests a strong impact of initial pre-industrial 
development on present-day transaction costs. In particular, the 
descriptive evidence seems to suggest that societies with greater levels of 
pre-industrial development, particularly Belgium, the Netherlands, and a 
handful of other countries tend to have considerably lower transaction 
costs down to the present. The aggregate correlation (-.28) is statistically 
significant at 1%. 
 
3.4.2 The Prevalence of Toxoplasma Gondii 
Toxoplasma gondii is an intracellular parasite that causes 
toxoplasmosis. It is found worldwide and it is hosted by domestic cats’ 
intestines in which the parasite can undergo sexual reproduction (Tenter 
et al. 2000, Hill and Dubey 2002). If the intermediate host is infected, the 
parasite is embedded in the brain, which enhances its life cycle (Berdoy et 
al. 2000, Flegr et al. 2014). The parasites may also affect the behavior of 
intermediate hosts by worsening the motor performance, incurring 
learning deficits, and reducing the avoidance of open spaces (Hrda et al. 
2000, Flegr 2007, Sugden et al. 2016). A large and growing number of 
studies have linked the prevalence of pathogens such as toxoplasma 
gondii to the economic outcomes and political institutions. Letendre et al 
(2010) argue that infections diseases explain the incidence of civil wars and 
armed conflict, Thornhill et al. (2009) argue that the prevalence of 
pathogenic parasites successfully predicts the levels of democracy across 
countries. Flegr et al. (1996) and Webster (2001) demonstrate persistent 
adverse effects of toxoplasma gondii on individual behavior, linking it to 
higher levels of anxiety and fear, fear, worriness, and insecurity. Maseland 
(2013) shows that societies with greater prevalence of toxoplasma gondii 
have less cooperative cultural traits, greater levels of distrust, and 
deleterious institutional quality. 
The data on the country-level prevalence of toxoplasma gondii is 
from Flegr et al. (2007) who document the prevalence of toxoplasmosis in 
a set of 88 countries. We use the rate of prevalence adjusted to a standard 
age 22 years to eliminate prevalence-related differences caused by the 
differences in childbearing ages in various countries using Barber (2004) 
adjustment criteria. In Figure 3, we plot country-level prevalence of 
toxoplasma gondii against the first principal component of transaction 
costs. The evidence suggests that greater levels of toxoplasma gondii 
prevalence predict markedly higher level of transaction costs. The 
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correlation between toxoplasma gondii and transaction costs is 0.53, and is 
statistically significant at 1%, which confirms the relevance of toxoplasma 
for the varying levels of transaction costs across countries. 
 
Figure	3.	The	Prevalence	of	Toxoplasma	Gondii	and	Transaction	Costs	Across	Countries	
 
 
3.4.3 Cultural Traits 
A large and growing strand of literature subscribes to the view that 
culture matters for institutional development (Weber 1904, Willaimson 
2009, Tabellini 2008, Beugelsdijk and Maseland 2011, Beugelsdijk and 
Klasing 2016). Hence, culture should matter for transaction costs. Our 
measures of cultural traits are from Hofstede (2001) who distinguished 
between six latent dimensions of national culture. First, power distance 
captures the preferences for hierarchy and strong rules, which reflects the 
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which people rely on themselves or on the groups. Individualistic societies 
have looser personal ties, and often use “I” rather than “we” in personal 
communication. By contrast, collectivist societies have tight relationship 
prolonged into extended families and groups with mutually reinforcing 
support and loyalty when conflicts occur. Third, uncertainty avoidance 
reflects the tolerance for ambiguity where people face or avoid an 
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low-avoidance societies more openly accept different thoughts and ideas, 
impose fewer regulations and permit greater freedom of choice in the 
social environment. Fourth, masculinity vs. femininity dimension reflects 
the preference for a society based on assertiveness and material rewards 
for success. By contrast, feminine societies emphasize the preference for 
cooperation, modesty, care for the weak and poor, and place the quality of 
live above the materialist values. Fifth, long-term vs. short-term 
orientation dimension associates the past with the present and future 
action. A low degree of the dimension reflects somewhat stronger 
preference for time-honored traditions, while a high degree suggests that 
people view adaption and pragmatic problem-solving as essential. And 
sixth, indulgence vs. restraint dimension reflects whether or not joys are 
fulfilled. For instance, indulgent society allows for a free and generous 
gratification of human desires for having fun and enjoying life. By 
contrast, restrained society controls the gratification of human needs and 
regulates via strict social norms. We compute a more parsimonious 
measure of culture by taking the first principal component of the six 
dimension indicators. The resulting rotated measure reflects the combined 
prevalence of latent cultural traits captured by six underlying indicators. 
The latent cultural trait variable ranges from -3.32 in Denmark to 2.40 in 
Albania, and designates strong cultural differences across countries. 
Figure 4 plots transaction costs against the first principal component of 
culture. 
Figure	4.	Transaction	Costs	and	Latent	Cultural	Traits	Across	Countries	
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Figure 4 shows that higher values of the cultural traits variable are 
associated with higher transaction costs. Hence, societies with more 
collectivist tie, greater tolerance for unequal power distribution, greater 
uncertainty avoidance, greater masculinity, more short-term orientation 
and greater indulgence tend to experience considerably higher transaction 
costs. The aggregate correlation between transaction costs and cultural 
traits variable is 0.55 and statistically significant at 1%, respectively. 
 
4 Results 
 
4.1 Baseline Static and Dynamic Estimates 
Table 2 reports the dynamic Arellano-Bond estimates of TFP 
specification. The evidence suggests that transaction costs matter for TFP 
performance both across and within countries. In columns (1), we examine 
the contribution of the costs of business registration to TFP. The parameter 
estimates suggest that the duration and per capita income cost of business 
registration procedures hampers TFP growth substantially while more 
stringent minimum capital requirements tend to improve it. By adding the 
full set of covariates and allowing for common technology shocks, the 
estimates arguably suggest that in the presence of country-level 
heterogeneity bias and the full of set confounders, the negative effect of 
greater duration of business registration prevails. In the long run, 1 basis 
point increase in the duration of business registration procedures leads to 
11 percent TFP drop, respectively. 
Column (2) exhibit the effects of construction licensing 
requirements on TFP. In the presence of country-level heterogeneity bias 
and common technology shocks, the evidence suggests rather weak and 
indiscernible effects of permit requirements, costs and duration on TFP. 
Controlling for the state dependence of TFP, parameter estimates suggest 
that in the presence of technology shocks and country-level heterogeneity 
bias, the effect of permit requirements on TFP is not statistically different 
from zero, and hence, does not explain the adoption of new technologies 
and better firm-level production methods. Column (3) presents the effects 
of property registration procedures on TFP. The OLS specification with 
country- clustered S.E suggests that greater duration of property 
registration procedures and greater procedural complexity tend to 
backdrop TFP growth considerably. 
Spruk	and	Kovac:	Inefficient	Growth? 
Copyright © 20XX University of Perugia Electronic Press. All rights reserved. 
Table	2.	Dynamic	Effects	of	Transaction	Costs	on	Total	Factor	Productivity	Across	143	Countries,	2003-2014	
Cost	of	Starting	
Business	
Cost	of	Dealing	
with	
Construction	
Permits	
Cost	of	Property	
Registration	
Cost	of	Paying	
Taxes	
Cost	of	
International	
Trade	
Cost	of	Contract	
Enforcement	
Cost	of	
Resolving	
Insolvency	
(1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)	 (6)	 (7)	
Arellano-Bond	 Arellano-Bond	 Arellano-Bond	 Arellano-Bond	 Arellano-Bond	 Arellano-Bond	 Arellano-Bond	
Effect	
Size	
Robust	
S.E.	
Effect	
Size	
Robust	
S.E.	
Effect	
Size	
Robust	
S.E.	
Effect	
Size	
Robust	
S.E.	
Effect	
Size	
Robust	
S.E.	
Effect	
Size	
Robust	
S.E.	
Effect	
Size	
Robust	
S.E.	
#	Procedures	to	start	business	 .055	 .053	
#	Days	to	start	business	 -.119**	 .061	
Cost	of	starting	business	(%	per	
capita	income)	
.194	 .133	
Paid-in	minimum	capital	(%	per	
capita	income)	
-.113	 .133	
#	Procedures	to	deal	with	
construction	permits	
.073	 .054	
#	Days	to	deal	with	construction	
permits	
.055	 .072	
Cost	of	dealing	with	construction	
permits	(%	warehouse	value)	
.072	 .108	
#	Property	registration	
procedures	
.005	 .047	
#	Days	to	complete	property	 .091**	 .045	
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registration	procedures	
Cost	of	property	registration	(%	
property	value)	
-.059	 .071	
#	Hours	to	pay	taxes	per	annum	 .086	 .109	
Total	tax	rate	(%	commercial	
profit)	
.075	 .089	
#	Documents	to	export	 -.036	 .085	
#	Days	to	export	 -.073	 .121	
Cost	to	Export	(USD	per	
standardized	cargo	container)	
-.005	 .127	
#	Documents	to	import	 .070	 .100	
#	Days	to	import	 .057	 .139	
Cost	to	import	(USD	per	
standardized	cargo	container)	
.036	 .173	
#	Procedures	to	enforce	a	
contract	
.054	 .235	
#	Days	to	enforce	a	contract	 -.103	 .093	
Contract	enforcement	cost	(%	
claim)	
-.207***	 .066	
#	Years	to	resolve	an	insolvent	
firm	
.040	 .048	
Cost	of	resolving	an	insolvent	
firm	(%	estate)	
.399*	 .241	
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Recovery	rate	(cents	per	USD)	 -.093*	 .067	
Constant	Term	 .222	 .189	 .159	 .221	 .416**	 .197	 .417***	 .177	 .519**	 .238	 .383*	 .223	 .381**	 .205	
Obs	 980	 980	 980	 980	 980	 980	 980	
Covariates	(p-value)	 YES	
(0.000)	
YES	
(0.000)	
YES	
(0.000)	
YES	
(0.000)	
YES	
(0.000)	
YES	
(0.000)	
YES	
(0.000)	
Country-Fixed	Effects	(p-value)	 YES	
(0.000)	
YES	
(0.000)	
YES	
(0.000)	
YES	
(0.000)	
YES	
(0.000)	
YES	
(0.000)	
YES	
(0.000)	
Time-Fixed	Effects	(p-value)	 YES	
(0.000)	
YES	
(0.000)	
YES	
(0.000)	
YES	
(0.000)	
YES	
(0.000)	
YES	
(0.000)	
YES	
(0.000)	
TFP	Lags	 1	Year	 1	Year	 1	Year	 1	Year	 1	Year	 1	Year	 1	Year	
Wald	Test	
(Pr>χ2)	
[0.000]	 [0.000]	 [0.000]	 [0.000]	 [0.000]	 [0.000]	 [0.000]	
Notes:	 the	dependent	variable	 is	 total	 factor	productivity	 (TFP)	 index	computed	from	the	augmented	growth	model	with	human	capital	as	Solow	residual.	
Standard	 errors	 are	 adjusted	 for	 serially	 correlated	 stochastic	 disturbances	 and	 heteroscedasticity	 distribution	 of	 error	 variance	 allowing	 for	 intra-class	
residual	correlation	into	143	country-specific	clusters.	Cluster-robust	standard	errors	are	denoted	in	the	parentheses	for	each	empirical	specification.	Asterisks	
denote	statistically	significant	sample	regression	coefficients	at	10%	(*),	5%	(**),	and	1%	(***),	respectively.	
Spruk	and	Kovac:	Inefficient	Growth? 
27 Copyright © 20XX University of Perugia Electronic Press. All rights reserved. 
By allowing for the confounding influence of country-specific fixed 
effects, structural covariates and common technology shocks, we show 
that greater duration of property registration procedures tends to foster 
TFP growth considerably. The estimate confirms our notion of the 
screening effects of transaction costs, where a hike in transaction costs 
tends to improve productive efficiency by mitigating moral hazard, 
short-run opportunism and other sources of asymmetric information. In 
column (4), we find no effects of lighter tax payment procedures and 
lower rates on TFP either in or without the presence of fixed-effects and 
spatially dependent TFP behavior. Similar findings follow from column 
(5) where we find no effects of lower costs of international trade on the 
level of TFP, once time-varying technology shocks are controlled for. 
In stark contrast, column (6) exhibits the effects of contract 
enforcement costs on TFP performance. The evidence unequivocally 
suggests that higher costs of contract enforcement are associated with a 
marked drop in TFP level. The beta coefficient on the contract enforcement 
cost is by far the largest among all transaction cost coefficients in our 
cross/within-country TFP regressions. In particular, 1 standard deviation 
increase in the cost of contract enforcement relative to the value of the 
claim, tends to backlash TFP roughly by a quarter of the standard 
deviation, both of which is economically large and statistically significant 
at 1%. Allowing for the full set of unobserved effects and spatial 
dependence of TFP, we find that 1 percent increase in the cost of enforcing 
contracts tends to depress TFP by 0.20 percentage point respectively, and 
is statistically significant within 1% bound. In a similar vein, the estimates 
in column (7) confirm the persistent positive effects of better insolvency 
framework, proxied by recovery rate and duration of procedures, on TFP 
growth. Hence the baseline set of our regression confirms the dominant 
effects of contract enforcement costs and insolvency framework in 
explaining TFP dynamics across and within countries. In the Appendix, 
we present the full set of OLS estimates against the dynamic 
Arellano-Bond estimates from Table 2, and show that the OLS estimated 
parameter are consistent with the dynamic estimates. 
4.2 Instrumental Variable Estimates 
In Table 3, we address the endogeneity and potential reverse 
causation between transaction costs and TFP growth. This allows us to test 
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whether transaction costs happen before TFP, and whether a slowdown in 
TFP precedes rising transaction costs. We test the endogeneity of 
transaction costs by including each cost indicator separately in the 
structured setup to push out the potential collinearity bias inherent in the 
causal inference. The evidence readily suggests that the effect of 
transaction costs on TFP appears to be causal. However, not all transaction 
costs are equally relevant for TFP. 
Panel C shows the effects of the costs of business registration on 
TFP. The evidence suggests that the effect of per capita income costs on 
TFP tends to produce the negative causal impact while the duration of 
procedures, number of procedures, and minimum capital requirements do 
not. In particular, 1 basis point increase in the per capita income cost of 
starting business leads to 37% drop in TFP level in the long-run. The 
first-stage evidence on the plausibly exogenous sources of variation in TFP 
suggests that greater prevalence of toxoplasma gondii and less 
cooperative cultural traits tend to push transaction costs on a higher level, 
which produces the negative effect of business registration cost on TFP. By 
contrast, the other indicators of business registration costs do not seem to 
produce the negative structural effect on TFP. Panel D displays the effects 
of permit costs on TFP. In particular, the evidence shows that more 
complex permit procedure translate into the negative TFP effect while 
other types of permit costs do not. 
Table	3.	The	IV	Estimated	Effects	of	Transaction	Costs	on	TFP	Across	and	Within	
Countries	
Panel	A:	Second	Stage	
Structured	Setup	
Panel	B:	First-Stage	OLS	
Regression	for	Transaction	Costs	
IV	Diagnostics	
Structural	
Effect	
R2	 Covariates	 Urbanization	
Rate	in	1500	
Toxoplasma	
Gondii	
Cultural	
Traits	
Cragg-Donald	
Weak	ID	Test	
Stock	
and	
Yogo	
(2005)	
Max.	
Relat.	
IV	bias	
Panel	C:	Costs	of	Business	Registration	
#	Procedures	
to	start	
business	
-.020	
(.021)	
0.26	 ✓ -.158	
(.297)	
.002	
(.001)	
-.014	
(.021)	
5.36	 Less	
than	
30%	
#	Days	to	
start	
business	
-.057	
(.072)	
0.06	 ✓ -.152	
(.264)	
.0002	
(.001)	
-.004	
(.012)	
1.38	 More	
than	
30%	
Cost	of	
starting	
business	(%	
per	capita	
income)	
-.375**	
(.182)	
0.35	 ✓ -.017	
(.014)	
.0001*	
(.00009)	
.002**	
(.001)	
8.40	 Less	
than	
15%	
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29	
Paid-in	
minimum	
capital	(%	
per	capita	
income)	
-1.048	
(.727)	
0.03	 ✓	 -.0001	
(.009)	
.00005	
(.00043)	
.0003	
(.0004)	
1.70	 More	
than	
30%	
Panel	D:	Costs	of	Construction	Permits	
#	Procedures	
to	deal	with	
construction	
permits	
-.029***	
(.011)	
0.39	 ✓	 -.325	
(.224)	
.0004	
(.001)	
.051**	
(.020)	
16.45	 Less	
than	
5%	
#	Days	to	
deal	with	
construction	
permits	
.037	
(.149)	
0.63	 ✓	 .207*	
(.121)	
.0002	
(.001)	
.017*	
(.011)	
22.20	 Less	
than	
5%	
Cost	of	
dealing	with	
construction	
permits	(%	
warehouse	
value)	
-.157*	
(.082)	
0.26	 ✓	 -.097	
(.080)	
.0004	
(.0004)	
0.0004	
(.0037)	
3.84	 More	
than	
40%	
Panel	E:	Costs	of	Property	Registration	
#	Property	
registration	
procedures	
-.107***	
(.042)	
0.52	 ✓	 -.400	
(.272)	
.007***	
(.001)	
.048**	
(.022)	
81.10	 Less	
than	
1%	
#	Days	to	
complete	
property	
registration	
procedures	
-.067**	
(.035)	
0.44	 ✓	 -.039	
(.076)	
.0007*	
(.0003)	
.012*	
(.006)	
19.86	 Less	
than	
5%	
Cost	of	
property	
registration	
(%	property	
value)	
.405	
(.793)	
0.62	 ✓	 .458***	
(.185)	
.022**	
(.001)	
.010	
(.017)	
37.70	 Less	
than	
5%	
Panel	F:	Costs	of	Paying	Taxes	
#	Hours	to	
pay	taxes	per	
annum	
-.048	
(.043)	
0.17	 ✓	 -.421	
(.355)	
.001	
(.002)	
.013	
(.015)	
6.31	 Less	
than	
25%	
Total	tax	rate	
(%	
commercial	
profit)	
.018	
(.022)	
0.62	 ✓	 .142*	
(.089)	
.001**	
(.0004)	
-.008	
(.007)	
20.58	 Less	
than	
5%	
Panel	G:	Costs	of	International	Trade	
#	Documents	
to	export	
-.030***	
(.013)	
0.47	 ✓	 -.191	
(.163)	
.0001	
(.0008)	
.042***	
(.012)	
17.38	 Less	
than	
5%	
#	Days	to	
export	
-.036*	
(.021)	
0.51	 ✓	 -.046	
(.107)	
-.0006*	
(.0003)	
.018***	
(.005)	
10.58	 Less	
than	
10%	
Cost	to	
Export	(USD	
per	
standardized	
cargo	
container)	
-.003	
(.017)	
0.62	 ✓	 .095	
(.082)	
.002***	
(.0006)	
-.010	
(.007)	
32.85	 Less	
than	
1%	
#	Documents	
to	import	
-.036***	
(.012)	
0.41	 ✓	 -.212	
(.164)	
-.0006	
(.0007)	
.038***	
(.012)	
16.04	 Less	
than	
5%	
#	Days	to	
import	
-.120*	
(.072)	
0.04	 ✓	 -.018	
(.075)	
.0002	
(.0002)	
.007**	
(.003)	
2.83	 More	
than	
30%	
Cost	to	 -.001	 0.63	 ✓	 .093***	 .001***	 -.011**	 46.87	 Less	
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30	
import	(USD	
per	
standardized	
cargo	
container)	
(0.179)	 (.049)	 (.0004)	 (.004)	 than	
1%	
Panel	H:	Costs	of	Contract	Enforcement	
#	Procedures	
to	enforce	a	
contract	
-.025*	
(.015)	
0.27	 ✓	 	 0.0005	
(.0008)	
.030***	
(.010)	
44.62	 Less	
than	
1%	
#	Days	to	
enforce	a	
contract	
-.014*	
(.086)	
0.36	 ✓	 	 0.0002	
(.0011)	
.053***	
(.018)	
57.98	 Less	
than	
1%	
Contract	
enforcement	
cost	(%	
claim)	
-.085*	
(.049)	
0.81	 ✓	 -.211*	
(.125)	
	 .015	
(.012)	
8.29	 Less	
than	
15%	
Panel	I:	Costs	of	Resolving	Insolvency	
#	Years	to	
resolve	an	
insolvent	
firm	
-.023**	
(.995)	
0.29	 ✓	 -.356**	
(.142)	
	 .066***	
(.011)	
145.30	 Less	
than	
1%	
Cost	of	
resolving	an	
insolvent	
firm	(%	
estate)	
-.048*	
(.027)	
0.25	 ✓	 	 .0004	
(.0006)	
.015**	
(.005)	
53.15	 Less	
than	
1%	
Recovery	
rate	(cents	
per	USD)	
-.008*	
(.005)	
0.48	 ✓	 	 .0007	
(.0009)	
.089***	
(.009)	
303.55	 Less	
than	
1%	
Notes:	 the	 table	 presents	 the	 structural	 effects	 of	 transaction	 costs	 on	 TFP.	 The	 dependent	
variable	is	total	factor	productivity	(TFP)	index	computed	from	the	augmented	growth	model	with	
human	capital	 as	 Solow	 residual.	 Standard	errors	are	adjusted	 for	 serially	 correlated	 stochastic	
disturbances	and	heteroscedasticity	distribution	of	error	variance	allowing	for	intra-class	residual	
correlation	 into	 143	 country-specific	 clusters	 and	 12	 time-specific	 clusters	 using	 Cameron,	
Gelbach	and	Miller	(2011)	non-nested	multi-way	clustering	scheme	for	finite-sample	adjustment	
of	the	empirical	distribution	function	allowing	for	cluster-robust	parameter	inference	to	remove	
the	 structural	 inconsistencies	 arising	 from	 biased	 OLS	 covariance	 matrix	 estimator.	 Two-way	
cluster-robust	 standard	errors	 are	denoted	 in	 the	parentheses	 for	 each	empirical	 specification.	
Asterisks	denote	statistically	significant	sample	regression	coefficients	at	10%	(*),	5%	(**),	and	1%	
(***),	respectively.	
 
The effect of more complex permit procedures is less pronounced. 
In particular, 1 basis point increase in the procedural complexity (by 
expanding the number of permit procedures) tends to dampen TFP 
growth by 2.9 percent, respectively, within 95% confidence interval. In the 
first stage, the effects of costs on TFP appear to be properly isolated by the 
plausibly exogenous variation in the cultural traits. In particular, societies 
with less cooperative cultural traits tend to have substantially more 
complex permit procedures than countries with more cooperative cultural 
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traits. The test of weak identification (Cragg and Donald 1993) suggests 
that the relative bias triggered by the full set of IVs is less than 5%, which 
refutes the threats to identification. Panel E unveils the structural effects of 
property registration costs on TFP. The evidence points out to the notion 
that the negative effect of costlier property registration process on TFP 
appears to be causal. For each one basis point increase in the index of 
property registration procedure, our parameters predict 10.7 percent drop 
in TFP within 99% upper and lower confidence bounds. In the first stage, 
higher prevalence of toxoplasma gondii and less cooperative cultural traits 
lead to markedly higher transaction costs, and produce the negative 
structural effect of more complex property registration procedures on TFP. 
We also confirm a similar effect for the duration of property registration 
procedures, although the magnitude of the effect is substantially smaller 
than the magnitude of procedural complexity effect, but yet statistically 
significant at 1%, respectively. 
While we fail to confirm the negative effect of more complex tax 
payment procedures, our evidence testifies to the strong impact of costs of 
international trade on TFP despite the relatively weak OLS and dynamic 
panel evidence. In particular, greater administrative complexity in import 
and export procedures tends to stifle TFP growth consistently, which 
suggests that these barriers are an important vehicle behind the 
contrasting paths of TFP growth across and within countries. In the first 
stage, the less cooperative and rent-seeking cultural traits appear to be the 
dominant exogenous source of variation in TFP by pushing up transaction 
costs consistently. Lastly, we address the endogeneity of contract 
enforcement variables and insolvency framework variables. In Panel H, 
we find that 1 basis point increase in the procedural complexity of 
enforcing contracts tends to produce the 2.5% drop in TFP, respectively. In 
the first stage, less cooperative cultural traits are associated with higher 
costs of enforcement with both higher costs of enforcement both with 
respect to the number and duration of procedures. The parameter estimate 
on contract enforcement cost, by contrast, suggests that historical 
development, proxied by urbanization rate in 1500 largely explains the 
contrasting differences in modern-day transaction costs while cultural 
traits do not. In Panel I, we also confirm the negative causal effect of rising 
costs of resolving insolvency across the full set of indicators, which 
appears to be statistically significant. In the first stage, urbanization rate in 
1500, and cultural traits properly isolate the effects of costs on TFP. Weak 
identification test confirm few threats to the validity of our exclusion 
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restriction since the IVs tend to have less than 1% relative bias both of 
which confirms the plausible exogeneity and relevance of the proposed 
IVs. Hence, the costs of contract enforcement and costs of resolving 
insolvent firms appear to be relatively more important for TFP than other 
costs considered herein. 
 
4.3 Heterogenous Effects of Transaction Costs by Income Level 
The evidence in Table 2 and Table 3 shows that transaction costs 
matter greatly for TFP differences across countries. The question that 
arises from our estimates necessarily invokes the policy-related normative 
implications. Prior evidence is based on aggregate sample, which 
immediately invokes the effect heterogeneity across countries (Klick 2010). 
We address policy implications by replicating the core specification in Eq. 
(3) with the interaction effects between income level dummy variables and 
transaction cost indicators. This kind of structured setup allows us to 
detect which transaction costs policymakers at various country income 
levels should target to tackle the vested interests in the production 
process, policy distortions and barriers to entry that lead to sub-optimum 
TFP performance over time.  
Does the effect of transaction costs on TFP differ across income 
levels? We tackle the potential effect heterogeneity by excluding each 
individual income group off the full sample used in Table 2 and Table 3. 
Under a naïve approach, we would interact the GDP per capita variable 
and the set of transaction cost covariates and simply replicate the baseline 
cross-country TFP model with the full set of interaction terms. But since 
the TFP level is computed as a residual of the cross-country growth 
regression model, the interaction term between GDP per capita and 
transaction costs is not feasible. Instead, we keep the structure of the TFP 
model intact. To tackle the potentially heterogeneous effects of transaction 
costs on TFP, we replicate the core TFP specification from Eq. (3) on each 
income group for which we rely on World Bank Income Classification 
Scheme. In Table 4, the heterogeneous effects are presented on the 
sub-samples. The evidence suggests the effects of transaction costs across 
income levels remain stable although not pervasive across income groups. 
On balance, the evidence suggests that business registration 
procedures are relatively more important for TFP growth in low-income 
countries, but not at higher income thresholds. The barriers to 
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international trade appear to be pervasive across all income groups. The 
duration of property registration procedures appears to be a constraint on 
growth in low-income and high-countries but less so in middle-income 
countries. On the other hand, contract enforcement costs appear to be a 
major barrier to TFP growth in lower-income ladders. As countries sustain 
structural transformation, and achieve high-income threshold, our 
estimates indicate that inefficient insolvency procedures are possibly the 
major constraint on TFP growth, respectively. 
 
Table	4.	Heterogenous	Effects	of	Transaction	Costs	on	TFP	by	Income	Level	
	 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	
Included	Subset	 Low-Income	 Lower-Middle	
Income	
Upper-Middle	
Income	
High-Income	
Panel	A:	Costs	of	Business	Registration	
#	Procedures	to	start	business	 -1.387**	
(.615)	
.649	
(.589)	
.015	
(.400)	
-.195	
(.434)	
#	Days	to	start	business	 .274	
(.521)	
-.876	
(.572)	
-.278	
(.448)	
.450	
(.689)	
Cost	of	starting	business	(%	per	capita	
income)	
.409	
(.256)	
-.978	
(.764)	
-.315	
(1.891)	
-.931	
(2.052)	
Paid-in	minimum	capital	(%	per	capita	
income)	
9.973	
(7.624)	
10.993*	
(6.000)	
-16.658**	
(8.675)	
18.955	
(13.213)	
Panel	B:	Costs	of	Construction	Permits	
#	Procedures	to	deal	with	construction	
permits	
-.278	
(.846)	
.009	
(.488)	
-.254	
(.349)	
-.187	
(.323)	
#	Days	to	deal	with	construction	permits	 -.987	
(1.875)	
1.028	
(.998)	
-.469	
(.799)	
-.787	
(.713)	
Cost	of	dealing	with	construction	permits	
(%	warehouse	value)	
-.175	
(.842)	
.556	
(1.065)	
-.298	
(.794)	
1.944	
(2.635)	
Panel	C:	Costs	of	Property	Registration	
#	Property	registration	procedures	 .417	
(.579)	
-.301	
(.594)	
-.096	
(.503)	
-.203	
(.453)	
#	Days	to	complete	property	registration	
procedures	
-2.393*	
(1.400)	
.064	
(1.569)	
1.278	
(1.392)	
-.496**	
(.221)	
Cost	of	property	registration	(%	property	
value)	
3.252**	
(1.415)	
.649	
(.540)	
-.411	
(.587)	
.593	
(.632)	
Panel	D:	Costs	of	Paying	Taxes	
#	Hours	to	pay	taxes	per	annum	 .197	
(4.056)	
.843*	
(.545)	
-.002	
(.337)	
-1.771*	
(.991)	
Total	tax	rate	(%	commercial	profit)	 .033	
(.407)	
-1.297	
(1.782)	
.275	
(.898)	
-.746	
(.930)	
Panel	E:	Costs	of	International	Trade	
#	Documents	to	export	 -.192	
(.773)	
.571	
(.458)	
-.054	
(.507)	
-1.166*	
(.673)	
#	Days	to	export	 4.484**	
(2.210)	
-3.783**	
(1.751)	
1.291**	
(.676)	
-2.112*	
(1.202)	
Cost	to	Export	(USD	per	standardized	cargo	
container)	
-4.310*	
(2.444)	
1.265	
(1.442)	
-.363	
(1.833)	
.469	
(3.128)	
#	Documents	to	import	 -1.051	
(1.871)	
1.125*	
(.658)	
-.838	
(.915)	
1.786	
(1.366)	
#	Days	to	import	 -2.762*	
(1.876)	
1.894	
(1.248)	
-2.294***	
(.848)	
.254	
(1.305)	
Cost	to	import	(USD	per	standardized	cargo	
container)	
5.681**	
(2.371)	
-1.366	
(1.285)	
.330	
(2.475)	
-.637	
(3.943)	
Panel	F:	Costs	of	Contract	Enforcement	
#	Procedures	to	enforce	a	contract	 -1.474	 .058	 -.018	 .770	
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(1.140)	 (.620)	 (.995)	 (.586)	
#	Days	to	enforce	a	contract	 -1.552	
(1.421)	
1.074*	
(.574)	
.329	
(.374)	
-.039	
(.259)	
Contract	enforcement	cost	(%	claim)	 1.745***	
(.582)	
.072	
(.294)	
.157	
(1.688)	
-.929	
(.884)	
Panel	G:	Costs	of	Resolving	Insolvency	
#	Years	to	resolve	an	insolvent	firm	 .984**	
(.491)	
-.372	
(.633)	
-.144	
(.434)	
.475	
(.448)	
Cost	of	resolving	an	insolvent	firm	(%	
estate)	
-3.492***	
(1.378)	
-.628	
(.975)	
1.370*	
(.802)	
-1.113	
(1.032)	
Recovery	rate	(cents	per	USD)	 .286	
(1.257)	
1.166	
(1.232)	
-.451	
(.390)	
-1.169***	
(.355)	
Notes:	the	table	presents	the	effects	of	transaction	costs	on	TFP	across	and	within	countries	on	sub-samples	
across	 income	groups.	The	dependent	variable	 is	 total	 factor	productivity	 (TFP)	 index	computed	 from	the	
augmented	 growth	 model	 with	 human	 capital	 as	 Solow	 residual.	 The	 table	 presents	 the	 effects	 of	
transaction	 costs	 on	 TFP	 Standard	 errors	 are	 adjusted	 for	 serially	 correlated	 stochastic	 disturbances	 and	
heteroscedasticity	 distribution	 of	 error	 variance	 allowing	 for	 intra-class	 residual	 correlation	 into	 143	
country-specific	clusters	and	12	time-specific	clusters	using	Cameron,	Gelbach	and	Miller	(2011)	non-nested	
multi-way	clustering	scheme	for	finite-sample	adjustment	of	the	empirical	distribution	function	allowing	for	
cluster-robust	 parameter	 inference	 to	 remove	 the	 structural	 inconsistencies	 arising	 from	 biased	 OLS	
covariance	matrix	 estimator.	 Two-way	 cluster-robust	 standard	 errors	 are	 denoted	 in	 the	 parentheses	 for	
each	empirical	specification.	Asterisks	denote	statistically	significant	sample	regression	coefficients	at	10%	
(*),	5%	(**),	and	1%	(***),	respectively. 
 
4.4 Indirect Effects of Transaction Costs on TFP 
Is there a sizeable indirect effect of transaction costs on TFP both 
across and within countries? The evidence so far is primarily based on the 
direct effects of transaction costs while the indirect effects are neglected. 
We address the potential indirect effects of transaction costs and deploy 
five transmission channels based on the set of independent variables other 
than transaction costs. Using the expanded model specification with the 
full set of transaction cost covariates, we examine the indirect effects of 
transaction costs through five different exposure variables: (i) financial 
development (captured by credit-to-GDP ratio), (ii) trade openness 
(captured by trade-to-GDP ratio), (iii) macroeconomic stability (captured 
by log-normalized inflation rate), (iv) economic specialization (capture by 
the share of manufacturing in GDP), and (v) R&D (captured by the share 
of R&D expenditure in GDP). The evidence clearly suggests the indirect 
effects of transaction costs on TFP are substantially weaker although 
non-trivial. 
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In Table 5, the table presents the indirect effects of transaction costs 
on TFP across and within countries through five exposure variables. On 
balance, the evidence suggests that the indirect effects of administrative 
transaction costs are close to zero or marginally significant for individual 
covariates such as the number of start-up procedures. Greater 
administrative complexity in paying taxes is associated with less trade 
openness but somewhat greater specialization in productivity-enhancing 
manufacturing and greater R&D intensity. Costlier access to international 
trade is somewhat negatively associated with the level of financial 
development and with a lower share of manufacturing in GDP. In 
addition, the indirect effects of procedural transaction costs on TFP are 
noticeably stronger than the indirect effects of administrative transaction 
costs. Costly contract enforcement is significantly more likely to translate 
into a lower level of financial development compared to low-cost contract 
enforcement, and also makes the specialization in productivity-enhancing 
manufacturing less likely. In addition, dropping paid-in minimum capital 
requirements is associated with greater macroeconomic instability, which 
further undermines TFP growth. In a similar fashion, the weakness of 
creditor protection tends to downsize the level of financial development, 
and also appears to discourage the R&D intensity. On the whole, the 
evidence clearly suggests that indirect effects of transaction costs on TFP 
are too important to neglect although the strength of the indirect effects is 
noticeably stronger for procedural transaction costs in comparison with 
the almost non-existent indirect effects of administrative costs. 
 
4.5 Non-Linear Effects of Transaction Costs 
A final caveat about the validity of our estimates concerns the 
non-linear effects of transaction costs. We allow for the second-order 
polynomial in the baseline TFP model in Eq. (4.3) and introduce the 
quadratic term in the core model setup to tackle the potentially non-linear 
relationship between transaction costs and TFP. In Table 6, the non-linear 
effects captured by the quadratic term, are presented in more detail. 
Expanding the baseline TFP with the quadratic term allows us to examine 
whether the maximizing and minimizing levels of transaction costs can be 
invoked from the TFP model setup. The evidence confirms both the 
presence and persistence of non-linear effects of transaction costs on TFP 
although there is a notable distinction between the administrative and 
procedural transaction costs. Whereas the procedural transaction costs 
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tend to influence the between-country and within-country paths of TFP 
linearly, there appears to be a strong and sizeable set of non-linear effects 
of administrative transaction costs on TFP. In Panel A, three of the four 
variables capturing the start-up costs, exhibit statistically significant 
non-linear effect on TFP. The number of start-up procedures exhibits a 
typical hump-shaped effect on TFP with 12 procedures as the 
TFP-maximizing level. On the other hand, the cost of starting business 
tends to exhibit a U-shaped effect on TFP where the turn in the direction 
of the effect occurs at 66.1 percent of per capita income. In a similar vein, 
the relationship between paid-in minimum capital requirements and TFP 
is characterized by a U-shaped curve with the bottleneck occurring at 
181.1 percent of per capita income. 
A similar TFP turning point is indicated by the non-linear effects of 
the cost of dealing with construction permits, the number of property 
registration procedures and the number of hours to pay taxes. For 
procedural transaction costs, the evidence does not advocate the 
non-linear effects on TFP whereas the point estimates of the effects of 
administrative transaction costs highlight a substantially non-linear 
influence on TFP. The results convey the additional evidence on the ability 
of administrative transaction costs to enhance screening, deter moral 
hazard, and address adverse selection and the sources of short-run 
opportunistic behavior. In particular, the set of non-linear effects readily 
suggests that keeping the number and duration of procedures at a critical 
thresholds tends to accelerate aggregate efficiency and foster TFP growth 
both across and within countries. Keeping the administrative costs at the 
level that fails to tackle the sources of market failure tends to yield 
sub-optimum TFP growth and subsequently fails to materialize the 
efficiency gains and the technological breakthroughs necessary to uphold 
and sustain TFP at the frontier level. 
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Table	5.	Indirect	Effects	of	Transaction	Costs	on	TFP	Across	and	Within	Countries	
(1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)	
Transmission	Channel	 Financial	
Development	
Trade	Openness	 Macroeconomic	
Stability	
Economic	
Specialization	
R&D	
Exposure	Variable	 Credit-to-GDP	Ratio	 Trade-to-GDP	
Ratio	
Log-Normalized	
Inflation	Rate	
Manufacturing-to-GDP	
Ratio	
Share	of	R&D	
Expenditure	in	GDP	
Panel	A:	Cost	of	Starting	Business	
#	Procedures	to	start	business	 -.511*	
(.278)	
-.393**	
(.172)	
.096	
(.197)	
.138	
(.153)	
-.960**	
(.427)	
#	Days	to	start	business	 -.122	
(.375)	
-.424	
(.339)	
.483	
(.316)	
.221	
(.285)	
-.065	
(.529)	
Cost	of	starting	business	(%	per	capita	income)	 .384	
(.312)	
-.138	
(.099)	
.017	
(.635)	
-.516	
(.450)	
-3.163	
(1.984)	
Paid-in	minimum	capital	(%	per	capita	income)	 -.511	
(.438)	
-.128	
(.241)	
-9.910**	
(4.984)	
-.879	
(2.839)	
9.201	
(7.476)	
Panel	B:	Cost	of	Dealing	with	Construction	Permits	
#	Procedures	to	deal	with	construction	permits	 .252	
(.250)	
.139	
(.153)	
-.218	
(.262)	
.009	
(.210)	
.650*	
(.400)	
#	Days	to	deal	with	construction	permits	 .259	
(.375)	
-.345	
(.226)	
.019	
(.318)	
.620***	
(.243)	
.380	
(.890)	
Cost	of	dealing	with	construction	permits	(%	warehouse	value)	 .626	
(.503)	
.473**	
(.214)	
1.046	
(.908)	
.002	
(.419)	
.290	
(1.411)	
Panel	C:	Cost	of	Property	Registration	
#	Property	registration	procedures	 .038	
(.294)	
.134	
(.236)	
.450	
(.330)	
-.342**	
(.170)	
.056	
(.374)	
#	Days	to	complete	property	registration	procedures	 -.502	
(.448)	
.077	
(.140)	
-.774***	
(.264)	
.120	
(.359)	
.662	
(.649)	
Cost	of	property	registration	(%	property	value)	 -.160	
(.240)	
.077	
(.140)	
.017	
(.486)	
.120	
(.359)	
.172	
(.478)	
Panel	D:	Cost	of	Paying	Taxes	
#	Hours	to	pay	taxes	per	annum	 .465	
(.444)	
-.635**	
(.172)	
-.102	
(.379)	
.083	
(.301)	
1.030**	
(.497)	
Total	tax	rate	(%	commercial	profit)	 -.250	
(.472)	
-.535**	
(.186)	
.404	
(.432)	
1.026***	
(.416)	
2.287***	
(.804)	
Panel	E:	Cost	of	International	Trade	
#	Documents	to	export	 -.957***	
(.341)	
.153	
(.154)	
-.132	
(.381)	
-.518***	
(.209)	
-1.588***	
(.565)	
#	Days	to	export	 .090	
(.649)	
.441	
(.413)	
.349	
(.789)	
-.260	
(.427)	
-1.033	
(.819)	
Cost	to	Export	(USD	per	standardized	cargo	container)	 .008	 .368	 .110	 -.872*	 -.838	
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(.800)	 (.369)	 (.557)	 (.490)	 (1.070)	
#	Documents	to	import	 .352	
(.577)	
-.641*	
(.340)	
.494	
(.383)	
.683	
(.514)	
1.109	
(.865)	
#	Days	to	import	 -1.079	
(.683)	
-.109	
(.362)	
.895	
(.902)	
-.044	
(.352)	
.078	
(.630)	
Cost	to	import	(USD	per	standardized	cargo	container)	 -1.570*	
(.971)	
-1.297***	
(.472)	
-.799	
(.614)	
-.177	
(.558)	
.698	
(1.203)	
Panel	F:	Cost	of	Contract	Enforcement	
#	Procedures	to	enforce	a	contract	 -.517*	
(.294)	
-.478*	
(.261)	
-.001	
(.331)	
-.499**	
(.246)	
-1.189***	
(.440)	
#	Days	to	enforce	a	contract	 .306	
(.224)	
-.336	
(.231)	
-.007	
(.197)	
.314**	
(.149)	
.970***	
(.398)	
Contract	enforcement	cost	(%	claim)	 -.957***	
(.254)	
-.290	
(.203)	
-.426	
(.348)	
-.212	
(.271)	
.803	
(.812)	
Panel	G:	Cost	of	Resolving	Insolvency	
#	Years	to	resolve	an	insolvent	firm	 .565**	
(.284)	
.232	
(.178)	
-.833***	
(.238)	
.170	
(.294)	
.970***	
(.398)	
Cost	of	resolving	an	insolvent	firm	(%	estate)	 .956***	
(.356)	
.149	
(.248)	
-.485	
(.473)	
-.3967	
(.341)	
.803	
(.812)	
Recovery	rate	(cents	per	USD)	 -1.531***	
(.294)	
.242	
(.224)	
1.361***	
(.199)	
.027	
(.215)	
-2.404***	
(.376)	
Constant	Term	 5.504***	
(.162)	
5.001***	
(.183)	
.760***	
(.199)	
2.838***	
(.121)	
1.113***	
(.239)	
#	Observations	 1,634	 1,692	 1,605	 1,560	 1,297	
Theil	R2	 0.55	 0.22	 0.25	 0.28	 0.54	
#	Country	Clusters	 139	 141	 138	 134	 110	
#	Regional	Clusters	 27	 27	 27	 27	 27	
#	Time	Clusters	 12	 12	 12	 12	 12	
Notes:	the	table	presents	the	indirect	effects	of	transaction	costs	on	TFP	via	the	five	exposure	variables	across	and	within	countries.	The	dependent	variable	is	total	factor	productivity	(TFP)	
index	computed	from	the	augmented	growth	model	with	human	capital	as	Solow	residual.	Standard	errors	are	adjusted	for	serially	correlated	stochastic	disturbances	and	heteroskedastic	
distribution	of	error	variance	allowing	for	intra-class	residual	correlation	into	143	country-specific	clusters	and	12	time-specific	clusters	using	Cameron,	Gelbach	and	Miller	(2011)	non-nested	
multi-way	clustering	scheme	for	finite-sample	adjustment	of	the	empirical	distribution	function	allowing	for	cluster-robust	parameter	inference	to	remove	the	structural	inconsistencies	arising	
from	biased	OLS	covariance	matrix	estimator.	Two-way	cluster-robust	standard	errors	are	denoted	in	the	parentheses	for	each	empirical	specification.	Asterisks	denote	statistically	significant	
sample	regression	coefficients	at	10%	(*),	5%	(**),	and	1%	(***),	respectively.
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Table	6.	Non-Linear	Effects	of	Transaction	Costs	on	TFP	
Linear	
Term	
Quadratic	
Term	
N	 R2	 Non-Linear	
Effects	
TFP-	
Maximizing/Minimizing	
Level	
Panel	A:	Cost	of	Starting	Business	
#	Procedures	to	start	
business	
1.653***	
(.577)	
-1.369**	
(.648)	
1,192	 0.35	 YES	 12	Procedures	
#	Days	to	start	
business	
-1.180	
(.844)	
1.168	
(1.311)	
1,192	 0.35	 NO	 None	
Cost	of	starting	
business	(%	per	
capita	income)	
-4.586***	
(1.675)	
8.788*	
(4.839)	
1,192	 0.35	 YES	 66.1	percent	of	per	capita	
income	
Paid-in	minimum	
capital	(%	per	capita	
income)	
19.981**	
(9.112)	
-232.21***	
(76.505)	
1,192	 0.35	 YES	 181.1	percent	of	per	
capita	income	
Panel	B:	Cost	of	Dealing	with	Construction	Permits	
#	Procedures	to	deal	
with	construction	
permits	
-.223	
(.661)	
.802	
(.673)	
1,192	 0.35	 NO	 None	
#	Days	to	deal	with	
construction	permits	
-1.175	
(1.337)	
2.439	
(2.547)	
1,192	 0.35	 NO	 None	
Cost	of	dealing	with	
construction	permits	
(%	warehouse	value)	
-3.117**	
(1.442)	
3.616***	
(1.481)	
1,192	 0.35	 YES	 25.4	percent	of	the	
warehouse	
Panel	C:	Cost	of	Property	Registration	
#	Property	
registration	
procedures	
-.954	
(.611)	
1.035*	
(.652)	
1,192	 0.33	 YES	 7	procedures	
#	Days	to	complete	
property	registration	
procedures	
-.372	
(1.031)	
.252	
(.874)	
1,192	 0.33	 NO	 None	
Cost	of	property	
registration	(%	
property	value)	
-.947	
(1.221)	
1.079	
(1.329)	
1,192	 0.33	 NO	 None	
Panel	D:	Cost	of	Paying	Taxes	
#	Hours	to	pay	taxes	
per	annum	
-2.040*	
(1.221)	
2.159*	
(1.231)	
1,192	 0.33	 YES	 1,050	hours	per	year	
Total	tax	rate	(%	
commercial	profit)	
-.304	
(1.885)	
-.176	
(1.809)	
1,192	 0.33	 NO	 None	
Panel	E:	Cost	of	International	Trade	
#	Documents	to	
export	
-2.145***	
(.481)	
1.252***	
(.120)	
1,713	 0.26	 YES	 10	documents	
#	Days	to	export	 -2.104	
(1l874)	
2.344*	
(1.458)	
1,713	 0.26	 NO	 None	
Cost	to	Export	(USD	
per	standardized	
cargo	container)	
-1.995	
(1.405)	
1.003	
(1.254)	
1,713	 0.26	 NO	 None	
#	Documents	to	
import	
1.806	
(1.321)	
-1.332	
(.873)	
1,713	 0.26	 YES	 None	
#	Days	to	import	 -3.327**	
(1.566)	
3.133**	
(1.431)	
1,713	 0.26	 YES	 55	days	
Cost	to	import	(USD	
per	standardized	
cargo	container)	
2.225	
(1.886)	
-.070	
(1.773)	
1,713	 0.26	 NO	 None	
Panel	F:	Cost	of	Contract	Enforcement	
#	Procedures	to	
enforce	a	contract	
-4.097***	
(1.414)	
4.535***	
(1.870)	
1,192	 0.42	 YES	 35	procedures	
#	Days	to	enforce	a	
contract	
.193	
(1.120)	
.243	
(1.124)	
1,192	 0.42	 NO	 None	
Contract	
enforcement	cost	(%	
claim)	
-2.432*	
(1.467)	
1.797	
(1.440)	
1,192	 0.42	 NO	 None	
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Panel	G:	Cost	of	Resolving	Insolvency	
#	Years	to	resolve	an	
insolvent	firm	
.986	
(.922)	
-.266	
(.789)	
1,192	 0.36	 NO	 None	
Cost	of	resolving	an	
insolvent	firm	(%	
estate)	
.485	
(1.991)	
-2.365	
(3.828)	
1,192	 0.36	 NO	 None	
Recovery	rate	(cents	
per	USD)	
-.993	
(.857)	
-.192	
(.909)	
1,192	 0.36	 NO	 None	
Notes:	 the	 table	 presents	 the	 non-linear	 effects	 of	 transaction	 costs	 on	 TFP	 across	 and	within	
countries.	 The	 dependent	 variable	 is	 total	 factor	 productivity	 (TFP)	 index	 computed	 from	 the	
augmented	growth	model	with	human	capital	as	Solow	residual.	The	table	presents	the	effects	of	
transaction	 costs	 on	 TFP	 Standard	 errors	 are	 adjusted	 for	 serially	 correlated	 stochastic	
disturbances	 and	heteroskedastic	 distribution	of	 error	 variance	 allowing	 for	 intra-class	 residual	
correlation	 into	 143	 country-specific	 clusters	 and	 12	 time-specific	 clusters	 using	 Cameron,	
Gelbach	and	Miller	(2011)	non-nested	multi-way	clustering	scheme	for	finite-sample	adjustment	
of	the	empirical	distribution	function	allowing	for	cluster-robust	parameter	inference	to	remove	
the	 structural	 inconsistencies	 arising	 from	 biased	 OLS	 covariance	 matrix	 estimator.	 Two-way	
cluster-robust	 standard	errors	 are	denoted	 in	 the	parentheses	 for	 each	empirical	 specification.	
Asterisks	denote	statistically	significant	sample	regression	coefficients	at	10%	(*),	5%	(**),	and	1%	
(***),	respectively.	
4.6 Counterfactual Scenario 
Our results based on the OLS and IV methods suggest that higher 
transaction costs substantially reduce TFP level both across and within 
countries. The ultimate question pertains to the economic significance of 
the estimated effects. To what extent would TFP improve in response to 
lower transaction costs? Such a hypothetical counterfactual scenario might 
be the key to better understand the economic significance of transaction 
costs in shaping TFP levels.  
Our hypothetical counterfactual scenario is built in several steps. 
First, we estimate the full dynamic model specification TFP specification 
with lagged TFP term, the full set of transaction covariates, time-fixed 
effects and country-fixed effects. Second, we predict the level of TFP based 
on the parameter estimates from the dynamic TFP model specification. 
Third, we select the countries facing high transaction costs as set them as 
quasi-treated countries. Fourth, we estimate TFP gains by taking 
transaction cost parameters and the difference in transaction costs 
between the quasi-treated country and the benchmark level. Two 
benchmark levels of transaction costs are selected: (i) the lowest value of 
observed transaction costs in the sample, and (ii) the lowest value of 
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transaction costs in quasi-treated country’s income group. Such a 
hypothetical counterfactual scenario allows us to estimate the potential 
TFP gains if the high-cost country lowered transaction costs to the 
observed benchmark threshold. Since the potential TFP levels are 
observed in a panel, we average year-level TFP gains as a rough estimate 
of the TFP improvement in response to lower transaction costs. 
Table 7 reports the counterfactual scenario for a selected set of 
transaction costs for the quasi-treated high-cost countries. Panel A reports 
the TFP gains from lowering minimum capital requirements. The evidence 
suggests that lowering paid-in minimum capital requirements to the 
lowest value in the sample would raise TFP level in high-cost countries 
between 0.5% in Niger and 3.2% in Syria. The estimated TFP gains are 
noticeably larger for property registration procedures as shown in Panel B. 
If a high-cost country such as Brazil lowered the number of property 
registration procedures to the lowest in-sample level, observed in 
Norway, our estimate suggests that its TFP would improve by 15%. If 
property registration procedures were reduced by a similar amount in 
Argentina, its TFP would increase by 8%. But if Argentina simplified 
property registration procedures to the lowest level in its income group, 
observed in Belarus, its TFP would increase considerably less, i.e. by 4.9%, 
respectively. We find similar TFP gains from simplified property 
registration procedures for high-income countries such as Greece and 
France, where we predict an increase in TFP by 8.2%, and 4.6% if they 
reduced the costs to that of Sweden, the lowest observed value in our 
sample. 
Panel C reports TFP gains in response to lower property 
registration costs. If the high-cost countries reduced property registration 
costs to the lowest value in-sample level, our estimates predict an increase 
in TFP from 4.7 percent in Belgium to 23 percent in Uruguay, which is 
comparable with the TFP gains in response to less procedural complexity 
in property registration. In Panel D, we show that the countries gaining 
most in terms of TFP from more efficient and faster international trading 
are mainly Sub-Saharan African countries, where the TFP gains are in the 
range between 2% and 12%, respectively, depending on the observed level 
of this particular transaction cost. 
The estimated TFP gains are noticeably larger with respect to the 
costs of contract enforcement. Panel E reports the TFP gains from lowering 
the duration of contract enforcement for selected high-cost countries. 
Countries with the most sizeable TFP gains from lowering the time to 
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enforce the contract to the benchmark level appear to be Colombia and 
Slovenia, for which we predict an increase in TFP by 88% and 30% if they 
reduced judicial delays to the lowest observed level in the sample (i.e. 
Singapore). If India reduced contract enforcement time to the level of 
Singapore, our estimates imply that its TFP would rise by 29% in the 
long-run. For Italy and Greece, TFP would increase by 12% and 10% if 
contract enforcement time were at the benchmark level of Singapore. In 
Panel F, similar gains are apparent for the costs of enforcing contracts. For 
instance, our estimates imply that if high-cost countries reduced the cost 
of contract enforcement, relative to the value of the claim, to the level of 
Iceland (i.e. lowest observed value in the sample), TFP level would 
increase between 12% in Indonesia, and 30% in Venezuela, respectively. 
The evidence confirms large and broad-based TFP gains from lowering 
transaction costs to the observed benchmark levels. 
 
Table	7.	Total	Factor	Productivity	Gains	from	Lower	Transaction	Costs	
Quasi-Treated	High-Cost	
Country	
Income	Group	 Dynamic	
Effect	
(standard	
error)	
Overall	TFP	Gain	
Lowest	
in-sample	
value	
Lowest	in-sample	value	
in	the	income	group	
Panel	A:	Paid-in	Minimum	Capital	
Syria	 Lower-middle	 -.553**	
(.236)	
3.2%	
Guinea	 Low	 1.9%	
Niger	 Low	 0.5%	
Panel	B:	#	Property	Registration	Procedures	
Uzbekistan	 Low	 -.063*	
(.034)	
6.1%	 5.3%	
Brazil	 Upper-middle	 15%	 14.3%	
Algeria	 Upper-middle	 4.9%	 4.4%	
Argentina	 Upper-middle	 8%	 4.9%	
Greece	 High	 6.2%	
France	 High	 4.6%	
Panel	C:	Property	Registration	Cost	
Syria	 Lower-middle	 -.087**	
(.034)	
8.1%	
Albania	 Upper-middle	 4.2%	
Uruguay	 Upper-middle	 23%	
Belgium	 High	 4.7%	
Panel	D:	Import	Time	
Zimbabwe	 Low	 -.192***	
(.052)	
12.2%	 9.6%	
Mozambique	 Low	 4.9%	 6%	
Senegal	 Lower-middle	 2.8%	 1.8%	
Panel	E:	Contract	Enforcement	Time	
Bangladesh	 Low	 -.133***	
(.048)	
12%	 11.6%	
India	 Lower-middle	 29%	 26%	
Colombia	 Upper-middle	 88%	 82%	
Italy	 High	 12%	
Slovenia	 High	 38%	
Greece	 High	 10%	
Panel	F:	Contract	Enforcement	Cost	
Congo	DR	 Low	 -.135***	
(.042)	
12.6%	 12%	
Indonesia	 Lower-middle	 11.9%	
Venezuela	 Upper-middle	 30%	
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5 Conclusion 
In this paper, we examine the contribution of transaction costs to 
total factor productivity (TFP) for 143 countries in the period 2003-2014. To 
this end, we construct a compact measure of TFP as a Solow residual from 
the augmented growth model with human capital and unobserved effects, 
and build a variety of transaction costs indicators (World Bank 2014). The 
results suggest that higher transaction costs are significantly more likely to 
discourage TFP. Our evidence unveils the set of policy constraints, 
distortions and barriers to entry, which keep the vested interests in the 
current production process intact. The baseline OLS effects and dynamic 
panel estimates suggest that higher costs of business registration, property 
registration, contract enforcement, and insolvency proceedings matter a 
great deal for TFP differences across and within countries. These policy 
constraints, distortions and barriers to entry tend to condemn TFP through 
a multitude of transmission channels such as economic specialization, 
R&D and innovation, trade openness and the depth of financial 
development. These barriers to the adoption of efficient technologies are 
likely one of the missing puzzles behind the large and persistent TFP gaps 
across countries. 
Not all transaction costs are created equal. Our evidence shows that 
the costs of contract enforcement, property registration and insolvency 
proceedings appear to be substantially more important for explaining TFP 
gaps across and within countries than the costs of construction permits, 
costs of paying taxes, and costs of international trade. We also address the 
reverse causality between transaction costs and TFP to determine whether 
low TFP growth causes the deterioration of institutional environment or 
vice versa. To this end, we exploit the historical variation in urbanization 
rate in 1500, the variation in the disease environment, and the variation in 
latent cultural traits to isolate the effects of transaction costs on TFP from 
the potential identification threats. The evidence suggests that societies 
with less cooperative cultural traits, greater prevalence of toxoplasma 
gondii bacteria, and with higher urbanization rate in 1500 tend to have 
considerably higher transaction costs down to the present day. The 
negative effects of rising transaction costs on TFP gaps appear to be 
causal. 
Our paper also offers a set of policy recommendation to tackle high 
transaction costs. We show that a well-intentioned policymaker should 
identify the binding constraint on growth at country-specific income level 
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to determine which transaction costs constrain TFP growth. We also 
compute the TFP-growth maximizing levels of transaction costs, and show 
that while costs exhibit the growth-maximizing level, others do not. In the 
counterfactual scenario, reducing transaction costs to the benchmark 
levels observed in least-cost countries is associated with large and 
pervasive TFP gains where the cost of contract enforcement and property 
registration appear to be more important for TFP than administrative 
transaction costs. 
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Appendix 
Table	A.1.	Static	and	Dynamic	Panel-Level	Estimates	of	Transaction	Costs	on	TFP	
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S.E.	
Arellano
-Bond	
OLS	with	
Multiway-C
lustered	
S.E.	
Arellano
-Bond	
#	
Procedu
res	to	
start	
busines
s	
-.040	
(.291)	
.055	
(.053)	
#	Days	
to	start	
busines
s	
-.862***	
(.290)	
-.119**	
(.061)	
Cost	of	
starting	
busines
s	(%	per	
capita	
income)	
-.808*	
(.452)	
.194	
(.133)	
Paid-in	
minimu
m	
capital	
(%	per	
capita	
income)	
1.837***	
(.652)	
-.113	
(.133)	
#	
Procedu
-.106	
(.275)	
.073	
(.054)	
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res	to	
deal	
with	
constru
ction	
permits	
#	Days	
to	deal	
with	
constru
ction	
permits	
-.774***	
(.330)	
.055	
(.072)	
Cost	of	
dealing	
with	
constru
ction	
permits	
(%	
wareho
use	
value)	
-.721	
(.687)	
.072	
(.108)	
#	
Propert
y	
registra
tion	
procedu
res	
-.783***	
(.289)	
.005	
(.047)	
#	Days	
to	
complet
e	
propert
y	
registra
tion	
procedu
-1.092**	
(.510)	
.091**	
(.045)	
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res	
Cost	of	
propert
y	
registra
tion	(%	
propert
y	value)	
-.303	
(.307)	
-.059	
(.071)	
#	Hours	
to	pay	
taxes	
per	
annum	
-.763	
(.584)	
.086	
(.109)	
Total	
tax	rate	
(%	
commer
cial	
profit)	
-.295	
(.608)	
.075	
(.089)	
#	
Docume
nts	to	
export	
-.778***	
(.289)	
-.036	
(.085)	
#	Days	
to	
export	
-.180	
(.721)	
-.073	
(.121)	
Cost	to	
Export	
(USD	
per	
standar
dized	
cargo	
contain
er)	
-.138	
(.932)	
-.005	
(.127)	
#	
Docume
-.243	
(.647)	
.070	
(.100)	
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nts	to	
import	
#	Days	
to	
import	
-1.355**	
(.705)	
.057	
(.139)	
Cost	to	
import	
(USD	
per	
standar
dized	
cargo	
contain
er)	
1.693*	
(.991)	
.036	
(.173)	
#	
Procedu
res	to	
enforce	
a	
contract	
-.384	
(.390)	
.054	
(.235)	
#	Days	
to	
enforce	
a	
contract	
-.111	
(.301)	
-.103	
(.093)	
Contrac
t	
enforce
ment	
cost	(%	
claim)	
-1.200***	
(.311)	
-.207**
*	
(.066)	
#	Years	
to	
resolve	
an	
insolven
t	firm	
.789***	
(.302)	
.040	
(.048)	
Cost	of	 -.125	 .399*	
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resolvin
g	an	
insolven
t	firm	
(%	
estate)	
(.565)	 (.241)	
Recover
y	rate	
(cents	
per	
USD)	
-1.591***	
(.240)	
-.093*	
(.067)	
Constan
t	Term	
.165	
(.118)	
.222	
(.189)	
.183*	
(.106)	
.159	
(.221)	
.420***	
(.124)	
.416**	
(.197)	
.126	
(.124)	
.417***	
(.177)	
.462***	
(.094)	
.519**	
(.238)	
.440***	
(.166)	
.383*	
(.223)	
.772***	
(.087)	
.381**	
(.205)	
Obs	 1,713	 980	 1,713	 980	 1,713	 980	 1,713	 980	 1,713	 980	 1,713	 980	 1,713	 1,713	
Adj.	R2	 0.04	 0.02	 0.06	 0.01	 0.15	 0.09	 0.21	 0.20	
Covariat
es	
(p-value
)	
NO	 YES	
(0.000)	
NO	 YES	
(0.000)	
NO	 YES	
(0.000)	
NO	 YES	
(0.000)	
NO	 YES	
(0.000)	
NO	 YES	
(0.000)	
NO	 YES	
(0.000)	
Country
-Fixed	
Effects	
(p-value
)	
NO	 YES	
(0.000)	
NO	 YES	
(0.000)	
NO	 YES	
(0.000)	
NO	 YES	
(0.000)	
NO	 YES	
(0.000)	
NO	 YES	
(0.000)	
NO	 YES	
(0.000)	
Time-Fi
xed	
Effects	
(p-value
)	
NO	 YES	
(0.000)	
NO	 YES	
(0.000)	
NO	 YES	
(0.000)	
NO	 YES	
(0.000)	
NO	 YES	
(0.000)	
NO	 YES	
(0.000)	
NO	 YES	
(0.000)	
TFP	
Lags	
1	Year	 1	Year	 1	Year	 1	Year	 1	Year	 1	Year	 1	Year	
Wald	
Test	
(Pr>χ2)	
[0.000]	 [0.000]	 [0.000]	 [0.095]	 [0.000]	 [0.000]	 [0.000]	 [0.355]	 [0.000]	 [0.000]	 [0.000]	 [0.000]	 [0.000]	 [0.000]	
Notes:	the	dependent	variables	is	total	factor	productivity	(TFP)	index	computed	from	the	augmented	growth	model	with	human	capital	as	Solow	residual.	
Standard	errors	are	adjusted	for	serially	correlated	stochastic	disturbances	and	heteroskedastic	distribution	of	error	variance	allowing	for	intra-class	residual	
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correlation	into	143	country-specific	clusters	and	12	time-specific	clusters	using	Cameron,	Gelbach	and	Miller	(2011)	non-nested	multi-way	clustering	scheme	
for	finite-sample	adjustment	of	the	empirical	distribution	function	allowing	for	cluster-robust	parameter	 inference	to	remove	the	structural	 inconsistencies	
arising	from	biased	OLS	covariance	matrix	estimator.	Two-way	cluster-robust	standard	errors	are	denoted	in	the	parentheses	for	each	empirical	specification.	
Asterisks	denote	statistically	significant	sample	regression	coefficients	at	10%	(*),	5%	(**),	and	1%	(***),	respectively.	
